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I. INTRODUCrION
Consider this situation. A public college is in the process of expanding
a campus. Students are registered for classes and it is important to those
students, the local economy, and the quality of life in the community, that
higher education continue to be provided on an ongoing basis. Unfortu-
nately, despite careful planning to anticipate need and timely com-
mencement of the construction project, unforeseen difficulties have
arisen. Completion of construction will be delayed by six to eighteen
months. The college has been leasing space for classes in a nearby office
building, but the lease is expiring. The landlord refuses to extend the
lease on any terms. After an exhaustive search, the college can obtain no
other space in the area. It is faced with canceling most classes for the
remainder of the construction period. Students and the public will be
outraged. The college administration very much wants to continue to
serve the public's needs.1
Consider another example. In response to the sudden bankruptcy and
closure of the manufacturing plant of a major local employer, a govern-
mental entity needs to lease space in which to provide job retraining and
workforce development services to those who have lost their jobs. In
order to properly provide services, the governmental entity needs to lo-
cate the service center within a specific area of the county that is easily
accessible by public transportation and that provides lots of free parking
for the large number of clients who will be making lengthy visits to the
service center. The governmental entity can find no space within the tar-
geted area that meets all of its needs, except for a large vacant space
within a shopping center. The center's owners refuse to rent the space
1. This is an actual problem that I encountered as general counsel for Miami-Dade
College (MDC). It is a matter of public record. When the college initiated the procedural
steps preliminary to eminent domain, the landlord extended MDC's lease. In the years
since then, I have remained fascinated by the theoretical, philosophical, and practical is-
sues that might be involved in such a case, but I have found very little written on this topic.
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for this type of use because of the demand on parking, and because the
clientele is not that which the shopping center wishes to attract. The gov-
ernment does not want to purchase a facility because it believes that the
program is not likely to be needed in this location for longer than three
2years.
Why not use eminent domain to create the leaseholds that will provide
solutions to these important problems? Perhaps it is time for governmen-
tal entities to seriously consider using eminent domain to acquire less
than a fee simple interest in real property when the specific need is im-
portant, of a limited-rather than an indefinite-duration, and a bar-
gained-for exchange cannot be negotiated. Many state and local gov-
ernments are in financial difficulty, and the federal government claims to
seek more cash-conscious means of providing services in order to reduce
the deficit. The public might be better served if cash-strapped govern-
ments leased property rather than expending scarce tax dollars to pur-
chase real property in fee simple through use of eminent domain. How-
ever, serious problems lie just below the surface of this seemingly good
solution.
It is fairly common for part or all of a tenant's interest in real property
to be taken when a governmental entity uses eminent domain to acquire
fee simple title to the landlord's realty in which the tenant's space is lo-
cated.3 Commercial leases typically contain provisions applicable to par-
tial or total condemnation. Treatises address the situation,5 and much
has been written about strategies for such situations in texts on commer-
cial leasing and eminent domain.
2. Although this fact pattern is hypothetical, government need for leased space to
address a particular, urgent need occurs on a fairly frequent basis.
3. See 4 JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 13.08(1) (rev. 3d
ed. 2003) (revised by Sandra R. Bullington); 2 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 17A.01(2)
(Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2005).
4. 2 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 3, § 17A.01(2), at 17A-20; Victor P.
Goldberg, Thomas W. Merrill & Daniel Unumb, Bargaining in the Shadow of Eminent
Domain: Valuing and Apportioning Condemnation Awards Between Landlord and Tenant,
34 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1083, 1087-88 (1987); Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Validity, Construc-
tion, and Effect of Statute or Lease Provision Expressly Governing Rights and Compensa-
tion of Lessee upon Condemnation of Leased Property, 22 A.L.R.5th 327, 350-63 (1994);
see also ARTHUR J. MENOR, FLA. BAR, FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY COMPLEX
TRANSACTIONS: LEASES §§ 10.23-.25 (4th ed. 2005).
5. See, e.g., 2 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 3, § 17A.01(2)(c), at 17A-20,
§ 17A.03(1)(a)(iii), at 17A-62; 5 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 40.14 (David A. Tho-
mas ed., 2005). 2 JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 5.02 (6)(a) (rev.
3d ed. 2003) (revised by David Schultz). See generally JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON
EMINENT DOMAIN (rev. 3d ed. 2003) (containing an index with almost three full pages of
references devoted to the taking of leased property.
6. See generally THEODORE J. NOVAK, BRIAN W. BLAESSER & THOMAS F.
GESELBRACHT, CONDEMNATION OF PROPERTY: PRACTICE AND STRATEGIES FOR WIN-
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By contrast, there is little literature about the legal issues, policy con-
siderations, or practical ramifications that arise when the government
seeks to use eminent domain to create a leasehold interest in real prop-
erty rather than acquiring a fee simple. The limited writings and case law
on the topic summarily state that government can engage in such action
as if it were beyond question. The careful analysis necessary to prove or
disprove the conclusion is missing from the literature. Likewise, the con-
troversial consequences of an affirmative answer have not been exam-
ined. This Article seeks to fill a part of that void. It examines, in detail,
the question of whether or not a governmental entity can establish a
leasehold through condemnation proceedings under its power of eminent
domain. It then moves to the question of whether, or under what circum-
stances, government should use condemnation proceedings to establish a
leasehold. The Article examines the severe problems that can arise from
such government action. Finally, the Article suggests possible solutions.
It suggests limitations that both respect the government's ability to en-
gage in takings, and uphold the checks and balances and individual
autonomy that are essential to our social order and system of govern-
ment.
Part II provides an overview of that portion of takings law that is ger-
mane to the Article. Part III analyzes whether a governmental entity can
create a term for years through condemnation proceedings based on the
exercise of its power of eminent domain. It concludes that, under current
law, government can take such action whenever eminent domain is a
permissible means of obtaining fee simple title. This includes the power
to use eminent domain to create leaseholds to be transferred to private
parties in transactions analogous to Kelo v. City of New London.8
Part IV of this Article summarizes the circumstances, albeit limited, in
which government ought to use eminent domain proceedings to establish
a leasehold. It also introduces some of the concerns that can arise even
from appropriate use of the power. Part V exposes serious problems that
can arise out of such takings. A number of these harms are specific to
takings that create a leasehold. Others can arise in takings in general but
are exacerbated because of the unique circumstances that accompany
NING JUST COMPENSATION (1994); Goldberg, Merrill & Unumb, supra note 4, at 1084;
Zitter, supra note 4, at 327.
7. See DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 183 (2002);
ROBERT MELTZ, DWIGHT H. MERRIAM & RICHARD M. FRANK, THE TAKINGS ISSUE:
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON LAND-USE CONTROL AND ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION 124-25 (1999); 4A JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN §
14.01 (rev. 3d ed. 2003) (revised by Robert A. Slavitt); William B. Stoebuck, A General
Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553,605 (1972).
8. 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005); see also infra notes 22-33 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Kelo in further detail).
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condemnation proceedings to create a leasehold. Part V also explores
whether these concerns are so intractable as to require prohibition of
condemnation proceedings to establish leaseholds on the basis of public
policy, but concludes that such a drastic remedy is not warranted. Ulti-
mately, adjustments to the calculation of just compensation can amelio-
rate a number of the concerns, and refinements to the calculation are
suggested. There are, however, remaining concerns that are so severe
that I propose that eminent domain to create leaseholds through con-
demnation proceedings be limited as a matter of public policy to elimi-
nate the most egregious harms to the public. Part V suggests limiting the
permissible scope of condemnations that create leaseholds to those in
which government itself, the public, or a private entity acting as an agent
of government is occupying the leasehold. This provides the most effec-
tive and efficient solution. It is simpler to administer than other ap-
proaches, preserves the ability of government to use condemnation pro-
ceedings to establish a leasehold in appropriate circumstances, eliminates
the most egregious harms, and protects from government intrusion the
sphere of individual autonomy that is essential to the preservation of our
social fabric. Part VI summarizes the proposed solutions.
IL BACKGROUND
The Takings Clause of the United States Constitution reads: "Nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. "9 It
applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.0 The constitutions of most states also contain takings
clauses."
Today, two types of takings are recognized: traditional physical takings
and regulatory takings. 2 Physical takings are typically accomplished
through the exercise of the power of eminent domain, through which the
governmental entity acquires land or an interest in land 13 from a land-
owner in an action for condemnation. 4 A physical taking can also be the
9. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City of
Chi., 166 U.S. 226, 238-39 (1897).
11. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 20; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 19;
TEx. CONST. art. I, § 17.
12. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 321-22 (2002).
13. This Article discusses takings in the context of real property. However, virtually
any type of "property" can be the subject of a taking. See, e.g., Brown v. Legal Found. of
Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 220 (2003) (interest on lawyers' trust accounts (IOLTA accounts));
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 990 (1984) (trade secrets); City of Oakland v.
Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 834, 837 (Cal. 1982) (en banc) (football team).
14. Sometimes the process stops short of judgment in condemnation proceedings and
the government negotiates a purchase in lieu of eminent domain. See Thomas W. Merrill,
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result of a permanent invasion of an owner's property by the govern-
ment'5 or a third party acting with government authorization.16 A regula-
tory taking arises when a governmental entity regulates an owner's use of
his or her land so extensively that it is the equivalent of a taking. 7 Both
physical and regulatory takings are forced exchanges in which the prop-
erty owner's interest in land is taken without the owner's consent.
The Takings Clause does not bar the government from taking private
property within its jurisdiction. Nor does it empower the government to
take private property." Rather, the Takings Clause acts as a limitation
on that power.'9 The Clause operates whenever "private property" is
"taken" by government?' Government can do so only when such taking
is for "public use," and only if the government pays "just compensation"
to the owner of that property.2' A body of law and considerable scholar-
ship has arisen around each of these requirements.
The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 77 (1986). A purchase in lieu of
condemnation provides certain federal income tax benefits to the condemnee. See I.R.C. §
1033 (2006).
15. See infra notes 97-105 and accompanying text; see also MELTZ, MERRIAM &
FRANK, supra note 7, at 124-25.
16. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421
(1982).
The cause of action, inverse condemnation, arises under traditional physical takings
theory when the government appropriates a landowner's property without aid of condem-
nation proceedings, and the landowner, rather than the government, institutes legal action.
See, e.g., United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 255 (1980). At the time that the Constitu-
tion was written and until 1922, physical takings were the only takings recognized by the
courts. MELTZ, MERRIAM & FRANK, supra note 7, at 119.
17. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). Today, inverse condemnation
actions are also the means utilized by property owners in situations in which they believe
that a regulatory taking has taken place. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1009 (1992); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304, 306-07 (1987).
18. In addition to takings proceedings initiated by government, sometimes such au-
thorization is given to public utilities. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 361.01-.08, 362.02 (West
1999 & Supp. 2007).
The power to take private property is a characteristic of sovereign power. Kohl v.
United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371-72 (1875); NOVAK, BLAESSER & GESELBRACHT, supra
note 6, at 4. In the United States, authorizing legislation is needed before government can
lawfully occupy or condemn private land. Id at 5; 1A JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON
EMINENT DOMAIN § 3.03(1) (rev. 3d ed. 2003) (revised by David Schultz); Stoebuck, supra
note 7, at 566-67.
19. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2667 n.19 (2005) (citing E. Enters. v.
Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 545 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in
part)); see also DANA & MERRILL, supra note 7, at 2.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
21. Id.; see also DANA & MERRILL, supra note 7, at 1-7 (providing students with an
excellent, concise, introductory explanation of these requirements and the recurring is-
sues).
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The 2005 case, Kelo v. City of New London, reflects the current contro-
versy with respect to the public use element,22 a topic that has implica-
tions for this Article. In Kelo, the city of New London, Connecticut
sought to assemble ninety acres of privately owned real property in a
nonblighted neighborhood for economic redevelopment.2 The assem-
bled parcels would be conveyed to private parties for redevelopment as a
research and development facility, marina, housing, and other private
uses.24 Redevelopment planners hoped to use the establishment of a
$300,000,000 research facility by the pharmaceutical company Pfizer Inc.
on nearby land as a catalyst for economic rejuvenation. 2 The New Lon-
don Development Corporation (NLDC), acting on behalf of the City,
filed eminent domain proceedings with respect to land that could not be
acquired through negotiated purchases.26 A number of the condemnees
contested on grounds that this taking for transfer to a private party for
private use did not constitute a public use as required by the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 27 The five-to-four deci-
sion of the Supreme Court upholding the taking has generated consider-
able controversy. 8 The majority found that Berman v. Parker,29 Hawaii
Housing Authority v. Midkiff,30 and Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Brad-
ley,3' provided controlling precedent.2 The majority of Justices found
that "public use" under the Fifth Amendment has the broader meaning
22. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2658.
23. Id. at 2660.
24. Id. at 2659-60. The city of New London had experienced economic decline for
decades. Id. at 2658. The situation worsened with the closure of a naval facility in the city,
which prompted "state and local officials to target New London, and particularly its Fort
Trumbull area, for economic revitalization." Id. at 2658-59.
25. Id. at 2659. The Pfizer project was announced publicly in February 1998, the
month following state authorization of a $15,000,000 bond issue for the Ft. Trumbull area,
$5,350,000 of which was "to support the NLDC's [the New London Development Corpora-
tion-a private nonprofit entity created to help plan economic development] planning
activities." Id.
26. Id. at 2660.
27. Id.
2& See, e.g., Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London:
An Argument for Banning Economic Development Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
491, 493-96 (2006); Brett Talley, Recent Development, Restraining Eminent Domain
Through Just Compensation: Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005), 29
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 759, 759-60 (2006); Charles Lane, Justices Affirm Property Sei-
zures, WASH. POST, June 24, 2005, at Al; Associated Press, Homes May be 'Taken' for
Private Projects, MSNBC.coM, June 23, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8331097/; Bill
Mears, Supreme Court Backs Municipal Land Grabs, CNN.CoM, June 24, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/06/24/scotus.property/.
29. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
30. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
31. 164 U.S. 112 (1896).
32 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2662-63, 2667-68.
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of "public purpose, 33 and that "[t]he City ha[d] carefully formulated an
economic development plan that it believe[d] w[ould] provide apprecia-
ble benefits to the community, including-but by no means limited to-
new jobs and increased tax revenue., 34 The majority noted "that there
was no evidence of an illegitimate purpose"35 and "the City's develop-
ment plan was not adopted to benefit a particular class of identifiable
individuals";3 6 then, the majority concluded, "[gliven the comprehensive
character of the plan, the thorough deliberation that preceded its adop-
tion, and the limited scope of our review... the takings... satisfy the ...
Fifth Amendment. 3 7  Impassioned dissents argued that all privately
owned property is now at risk of being taken for transfer to another pri-
vate party "[u]nder the banner of economic development." '38 The impact
of this decision upon temporary takings to create leaseholds is discussed
in detail in Part V.C.
In recent years, the subject of short-term, or "temporary," takings has
generally arisen in the context of regulatory takings. If a court finds that
the governmental regulation in question constitutes a taking, the gov-
ernment has three options. 9 The government can choose to rescind the
regulation.4° It can modify the regulation so that it no longer constitutes a
taking but rather comes within the police power of government so that
the government does not have to provide compensation to the property
owner under the regulation as modified.4 ' Finally, the government can
choose to keep the regulation in force, without modification, in which
event the government has chosen to exercise its power of eminent do-
main42 and must pay just compensation to the property owner.43
33. Id. at 2662 (citing Faibrook Irrigation Dist., 164 U.S. at 158-64).
34. Id. at 2665.
35. Id. at 2661.
36. Id. at 2662 (internal quotation marks omitted).
37. Id. at 2665.
38. Id. at 2671 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2677-78 (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing) (stating that the majority's interpretation of "public use" allows the Court to hold "a
vague promise of new jobs and increased tax revenue, but which is also suspiciously agree-
able to the Pfizer Corporation, is for a 'public use').
39. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987).
40. Id.
41. See id.
42. Id. This assumes, of course, that the other requirements of eminent domain, pri-
vate property and public use, are present. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
43. First English, 482 U.S. at 321. However, if that which is taken does not constitute
private property, the Takings Clause is inapplicable and no compensation is owed to the
owner under the Takings Clause. See id. at 314. If the taking is not for public use, the
government cannot proceed with the taking. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2661. Prior to the Su-
preme Court's decision in Kelo, one of the key cases in the development of the public
purpose interpretation, Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, was overturned
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Even if the government decides to rescind its regulation or decides to
modify the regulation so that it no longer constitutes a taking, the gov-
ernment must pay just compensation to the property owner for the pe-
riod during which the regulation constituted a taking." In such instances,
the determination of when such a temporary taking begins and ends be-
comes critical to the calculation of just compensation. 5
Court decisions and commentators who have considered temporary
regulatory takings tend to cite a series of cases from the World War II era
to establish the bona fides of the concept of a temporary regulatory tak-
ing and to provide initial guidance for the calculation of just compensa-
tion for such takings. For example, the Supreme Court's opinion in First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles4 relies
upon United States v. General Motors Corp.47 and Kimball Laundry Co. v.
United States," the same cases that first considered temporary physical
takings-in other words, the establishment of a leasehold through con-
demnation.49
These cases, each over half-a-century old, arose out of fact patterns in-
volving the nation's response to the attack on Pearl Harbor that thrust
the United States into World War 11.5o Because there is little literature
on the topic of leaseholds established as a result of condemnation pro-
ceedings, and that which exists does not analyze the issue but merely em-
ploys distinctly conclusory language,5 Part III of this Article analyzes
whether, under current law, government can create a leasehold in an
owner's real property through a traditional physical taking utilizing con-
demnation proceedings.
by the Supreme Court of Michigan on the basis of Michigan's state constitution. See Pole-
town Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981), overruled by
County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 787 (Mich. 2004); Symposium, The Death
of Poletown. The Future of Eminent Domain and Urban Development After County of
Wayne v. Hathcock, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 837 (2004). The Court's decision in Kelo
expressly states that nothing precludes the states from adopting more stringent limitations
pertaining to public use. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2668.
44. First English, 482 U.S. at 321.
45. David Schultz, The Price Is Right! Property Valuation for Temporary Takings, 22
HAMLINE L. REV. 281, 294 (1998); Gregory M. Stein, Pinpointing the Beginning and End-
ing of a Temporary Regulatory Taking, 70 WASH. L. REV. 953, 960 (1995).
46. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
47. 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
48. 338 U.S. 1 (1949).
49. See First English, 482 U.S. at 318.
50. See Kimball Laundry, 338 U.S. at 3; Gen. Motors, 323 U.S. at 375.
51. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
Catholic University Law Review
III. CURRENT LAW RECOGNIZES ESTABLISHMENT OF A TERM FOR
YEARS THROUGH CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS IN ALL SITUATIONS
IN WHICH EMINENT DOMAIN IS PERMISSIBLE
If one simply asks whether the government can take a leasehold
through condemnation proceedings, inevitably there is confusion be-
tween the rather commonplace event in which the government eliminates
a leasehold by taking the fee simple interest in real property that is sub-
ject to the leasehold, and the circumstances that are the subject matter of
this Article. The question must be posed with carefully chosen language
so as to avoid confusion between instances when the government uses its
eminent domain power to take real property that is subject to a lease,
thus terminating the lease,52 and instances in which the government uses
its power of eminent domain to create a term for years in the condemnor.
This Article examines the latter.53
The Supreme Court recognized short-term physical takings in General
Motors.5 It was soon followed by United States v. Petty Motor Co., 5 and
Kimball Laundry, among others." As mentioned in the concluding para-
graph of Part II, these three cases involved condemnations of the tempo-
rary use of real property for military purposes during World War II.
7
In each of these cases, the Court recognized that a taking had occurred
despite the finite duration of the takings. In General Motors, it was
stated that "the Government's power to take for a short period, and to
52. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
53. There is analogous confusion with respect to easements-situations in which a
government taking eliminates an easement and those in which the taking creates an ease-
ment. See 9 PATRICK J. ROHAN & MELVIN A. RESKIN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN §
32.01(3), at 32-6 (rev. ed. 2003); see also Stoebuck, supra note 7, at 603-04.
54. Gen. Motors, 323 U.S. at 380. Although commentators focus on General Motors
and its progeny when discussing temporary takings, it was not the first instance in which
the Supreme Court had before it a case dealing with a temporary physical taking. In A. W.
Duckett & Co. v. United States, 266 U.S. 149 (1924), the Court gave at least tacit approval
to a temporary taking of an interest in a pier for war purposes (World War I). Id. at 150-51
("On the face of those acts it seems to us manifest that the United States, although not
taking the fee, proceeded in rem as in eminent domain, and assumed to itself by paramount
authority and power the possession and control of the piers named, against all the world."
(first emphasis added)). The Court then went on to find that a tenant of the pier was enti-
tled to just compensation. Id. at 152.
55. 327 U.S. 372 (1946).
56. E.g., United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 115, 117 (1951); United States
v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 339 U.S 261,262 (1950).
57. Pewee Coal, 341 U.S. at 115-16 (involving the government's seizure and operation
of a coal mine to prevent a mine workers strike from hampering the United States' war
effort during WWII); Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 3 (1949) (condem-
nation of plant for use by the Army); Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. at 374 (condemnation of
building for government).
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demand possession of the space taken.., cannot be denied."5 The Court
also stated, with respect to the property interest that could be taken in
eminent domain:
That interest may comprise the group of rights for which the
shorthand term is "a fee simple" or it may be the interest known
as an "estate or tenancy for years," as in the present instance.
The constitutional provision is addressed to every sort of interest
the citizen may possess.' 9
In explaining its determination of the proper measure of just compensa-
tion for the term of years that was taken in that case, the Court said that
the government could not, by specifying a finite term for the taking,
rather than taking the fee, manipulate and thereby defeat its constitu-
tional obligation to pay just compensation.'O
Petty Motor Co. arose "out of a petition for condemnation of the tem-
porary use for public purposes of a building in Salt Lake City, Utah.",
61
The government condemned the private property for a term of approxi-
mately two and one-half years, with a right on "the part of the [govern-
ment] to surrender the premises on June 30, 1943," approximately seven
months after the beginning of the temporary term, or alternately, on June
30, 1944, approximately nineteen months after the beginning of the tem-
62porary term. In a footnote, the Court stated, "[n]o one questions the
authority of the United States to condemn this temporary interest.,
63
The issues to be decided by the Court in the case related to the determi-
nation of just compensation for tenants in the buildings whose leaseholds
were impacted by the condemnation. 64 The appropriateness of a tempo-
rary physical taking was treated as beyond question, and the exigencies of
5& Gen. Motors, 323 U.S. at 380. In this case, General Motors was the lessee of a
warehouse under a long-term lease and the government was a subtenant of part of the
warehouse. Id. at 375. The government filed condemnation proceedings to take a short-
term lease of the remaining space from General Motors, the long-term lessee. Id. In this
instance, the government itself was to use the premises taken. Id.
59. Id. at 378.
60. Id. at 381 (stating that the government cannot "defeat the Fifth Amendment's
mandate for just compensation in all condemnations except those in which the contem-
plated public use requires the taking of the fee simple title"). Based on this language, it
appears that the Court was concerned that the government might try to avoid the payment
of just compensation under the Takings Clause by engaging in temporary physical takings,
rather than takings of fee simple interests in land. Id. at 381-82. The Court would not
allow the just compensation requirement to be subverted in such a manner. Id. The
Court's opinion does not analyze whether or not a short-term taking of an interest less
than fee simple should be allowed at all. Rather, it reaches the conclusion stated supra
notes 54,57-58 and accompanying text. See Gen. Motors, 323 U.S. at 378.
61. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. at 374.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 374 n.2.
64. Id. at 373-74.
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war played no part in the Court's discussion as it appeared in the opinion,
except that the statute that constituted the legislative authority for the
taking happened to be the Second War Powers Act. 5
Kimball Laundry involved the condemnation of a laundry plant-land,
building, physical plant facilities, and operation of the laundry plant-for
military purposes, for an initial term of just over seven months, which
term could be extended from year to year at the election of the Secretary
of War.66 The laundry plant was to be used "to service, for pay, the laun-
dry and dry cleaning requirements of the soldiers, officers, and all the
Army hospitals, training centers, and forts in the Seventh Service Com-
mand." 67 The Supreme Court was conclusory in its statement that the
short term appropriation constituted a taking.6& The only issue was the
calculation of just compensation, as "it was known from the outset that
this taking was to be temporary, and determination of the value of tem-
porary occupancy can be approached only on the supposition [of] free
bargaining between petitioner and a hypothetical lessee of that tempo-
rary interest."69 Once again, the Court treated the legality of the physical
taking of finite duration under the Fifth Amendment as a foregone con-
clusion. Again, the fact of war was not discussed in the Court's opinion
and seemed to play no part in the determination that a taking had oc-
curred, or in the measure of just compensation.7 °
In each of these cases, the government brought the condemnations un-
der section 201 of the Second War Powers Act of March 27, 1942.7, Since
the purpose of each of the takings was to use the properties for war pur-
poses, it is likely that these takings would not have occurred but for the
wartime situation and passage of the Second War Powers Act.72 How-
ever, aside from providing the impetus for the authorizing legislation, and
the Supreme Court's recitation that the condemnations arose under that
Act, neither the conditions of wartime nor the Act were discussed in the
Court's opinions.73 Rather, the Court's decisions were grounded in its
65. See id. at 374-75; see also Second War Powers Act, ch. 199, 56 Stat. 176, 177 (1942)
(repealed).
66. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 3 (1949).
67. Brief of Petitioner at 5, Kimball Laundry, 338 U.S. 1 (No. 63).
68. See Kimball Laundry, 338 U.S. at 6-7.
69. Id. at 7.
70. See id. at 3-4.
71. Second War Powers Act, ch. 199, 56 Stat. 176, 177 (1942) (repealed); Kimball
Laundry, 338 U.S. at 3 n.1; United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 374 n.2 (1946);
United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373,375 (1945).
72. Similarly, in Pewee Coal, it is doubtful that the government would have seized
operation of the specific coal mines except that the strike "threatened to seriously cripple
... prosecution of the war" with potentially disastrous consequences. Pewee Coal Co. v.
United States, 88 F. Supp. 426,427 (Ct. Cl. 1950), affd, 341 U.S. 114 (1951).
73. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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interpretation of the Fifth Amendment, and focused on the determina-
tion of just compensation thereunder.74 Despite the absence of any dis-
cussion of the wartime circumstances, modern legal thought would as-
sume that such a critical political and social factor, as well as the Justices'
commitment to the war effort, played a role in the outcome of the cases."
Thus, it could be argued that a military attack on the United States, or
another exigent circumstance, is a necessary prerequisite for a taking
through condemnation proceedings to establish a leasehold.
This contention is overcome, however, because the General Motors line
of cases not only continues to be cited in situations not involving the exi-
gencies but also guides development of current case law, particularly with
respect to regulatory takings.71 Over thirty-five years after they were
originally decided, General Motors, Petty Motor Co., and Kimball Laun-
dry were relied upon by the Supreme Court to establish an entitlement to
just compensation for temporary takings in the context of regulatory tak-
ings in First English." Wartime, as well as other exigent circumstances,
78were absent from the situation.
Likewise, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Court of
Claims have recognized physical temporary takings under the Fifth
Amendment where neither wartime nor other exigent circumstances was
79present.
74. See Kimball Laundry, 338 U.S. at 5; Gen. Motors, 323 U.S. at 374-75. The use of
the Fifth Amendment as the basis of the decision was stated by implication in Petty Motor
Co. See Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. at 377.
75. Contrary to modern legal thought, a Langdellian formalist argument could be
made, based on the total absence of any discussion of the wartime circumstances in the
Court's opinions in any of these cases, that the exigencies of war played no role in the
Court's decisions, and accordingly, these cases constitute controlling law, regardless of
whether the nation is then at war or facing other exigent circumstances. See generally
Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PIr. L. REV. 1, 6-10 (1983). The opposite
interpretation would arise under legal realism, a theory of law prevalent at the time the
decisions were rendered. Legal realists would maintain that the nation's involvement in
World War II, a central feature of life in the United States at the time that the takings
occurred, would have played a role in the Court's decisions and that these cases cannot
properly be understood absent consideration of the circumstances. See generally Gerald B.
Wetlaufer, Systems of Belief in Modern American Law: A View from Century's End, 49
AM. U. L. REV. 1, 18-21 (1999). The impact of legal realism was so great that today, schol-
ars, practioners and students alike tend to assume that extant circumstances and judges'
viewpoints play a role in the outcome of cases.
76. See infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
77. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 318 (1987).
78. See id. at 306-07.
79. Skip Kirchdorfer, Inc. v. United States, 6 F.3d 1573, 1576-77 (Fed. Cir. 1993);
Hendler v. United States (Hendler II1), 952 F.2d 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Pettro v.
United States, 47 Fed. Cl. 136, 151 (2000).
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More recently, General Motors and Petty Motor Co. have been cited by
the Supreme Court expressly for the purpose of establishing that "com-
pensation is mandated when a leasehold is taken and the government
occupies the property for its own purposes, even though that use is tem-
porary."80 General Motors was also cited in the Court's 2005 decision,
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.81
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the General Motors line of cases,
which established short-term takings of a finite (if not definite) duration
as bona fide takings within the scope of the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, is still good law. Moreover, the existence of the exigencies
of wartime is not a necessary condition.82 Thus, short-term takings are
constitutionally valid. The legal reasoning of the General Motors line of
cases, as well as current cases, is grounded in the Fifth Amendment and
does not depend on involvement in war for its viability. 83 Nor does it de-
pend upon the existence of other exigencies.
The next issue to be considered is the matter of authorizing legislation.
In First English, it was noted "that the decision to exercise the power of
eminent domain is a legislative function." The Fifth Amendment,
standing alone, does not authorize governmental takings. Legislative
authorization is needed.g
The Second War Powers Act, the statute that authorized the condem-
nations in General Motors, Kimball Laundry, and Petty Motor Co., hap-
pened to be worded to expressly mention takings of temporary use. 6 The
legislation permitted the government to acquire "real property, tempo-
rary use thereof, or other interest therein" by condemnation. This could
80. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
322 (2002) (regulatory takings); see also Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 233
(2003) (involving IOLTA accounts).
81. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005) (holding, in a unanimous
opinion, that whether a statute substantially advanced a legitimate state interest was not a
valid method of identifying regulatory takings for which just compensation was required
because the test did not address the character or magnitude of the burden proposed).
Peewee Coal was also cited. Id. at 537.
82. See supra notes 71-79 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 74,78-79 and accompanying text.
84. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 321 (1987).
85. Hendler v. United States (Hendler III), 952 F.2d 1364, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
("Once legislative authority is obtained, authorized members of the government may de-
termine how and when the authority will be exercised."); 1A SACKMAN, supra note 18, §
3.03(1), at 3-46 ("[T]he right to authorize the exercise of eminent domain is legislative. In
the absence of direct authority from a legislature, there can be no taking of private prop-
erty for a public use, except in cases where the owner consents to the taking."); Stoebuck,
supra note 7, at 568-69.
86. Second War Powers Act, ch. 199, 56 Stat. 176, 177 (1942) (repealed).
87. Id.
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give rise to an argument that it is necessary that the legislation authoriz-
ing the condemnation make specific, express reference to condemnations
of temporary duration, in order for there to be a valid temporary taking. 8
This potential objection is not particularly persuasive because takings of
interests in private property of short-term duration are legislatively au-
thorized if takings of less than the fee fall within a statute's description of
the property that can be taken.
While the authority of government to engage in a taking can arise un-
der a variety of statutes,89 the Fifth Amendment sets the constitutional
parameters. If there is a taking of private property for public use, just
compensation must be paid.90 As mentioned above, in General Motors,
the Supreme Court stated with respect to the term "interest":
That interest may comprise the group of rights for which the
shorthand term is "a fee simple" or it may be the interest known
as an "estate or tenancy for years," as in the present instance.
The constitutional provision is addressed to every sort of interest
the citizen may possess.91
It is primarily the right to use one's property that is the interest taken in
regulatory takings. 92 Similarly, it is the right to use one's property for a
period of temporary duration that is the interest taken in a temporary
physical taking.93 The right to occupy and use one's real property is a key
characteristic of an interest in property.' Likewise, the right to exclude is
also one of the key rights incident to the ownership of an interest in
property.95 When government appropriates for itself a term of years dur-
ing which it can use the landowner's land without his consent, the gov-
8& See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 127.01(1)(a) (West Supp. 2007) ("The absolute fee
simple title to all property so taken and acquired shall vest in such county unless the
county seeks to condemn a particular right or estate in such property.").
89. See, e.g., id. §§ 127.01-.02 (delegating the power of eminent domain to county
governments); id. § 1013.25 (West 2004) (granting the power of eminent domain to public
universities and community colleges in Florida "[w]henever it becomes necessary for the
welfare and convenience of any of its institutions or divisions to acquire private property
for the use of such institutions").
90. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
91. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945).
92. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 319 (1987).
93. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text; see also Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) ("Property rights in a physical thing
have been described as the rights 'to possess, use and dispose of it."' (quoting Gen. Motors,
323 U.S. at 378)).
94. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435.
95. Id.; see also Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 159-60 (Wis. 1997);
MELTZ, MERRIAM & FRANK, supra note 7, at 117 ("[Olne of the most revered incidents of
ownership-the right to exclude others-[is] a right that should be 'tenaciously guarded by
the courts."' (quoting Cable Holdings of Ga. v. McNeil Real Estate Fund VI, 953 F.2d 600,
605 (11th Cir. 1992))).
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ernment, having destroyed the owner's right to use and occupancy, and
the owner's right to exclude the condemnor for the duration of the term,
has deprived the landowner of an interest in private property for the du-
ration of that term, just as surely as the government has deprived a land-
owner of an interest in his property when it effectuates a taking of fee
simple title.96 In both instances, an interest in property has been taken;
the only distinction is the duration of the deprivation based on the nature
of the interest that was taken. Thus, it is clear that statutory language
that merely authorizes takings of private "property," without expressly
mentioning periods of temporary duration, is sufficient to include within
its meaning takings of that interest in real property known as an estate
for years.
Another issue is the proper interpretation of the term "permanent" as
it appears in some cases and discussions of physical takings, most notably,
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,97 which seems to be a
source of the confusion.9' In that case, the majority distinguished a per-
manent occupation of real property by government, which the Court
found to invariably constitute a taking, from a temporary invasion of
property, "or government action outside the owner's property that causes
consequential damages" on the owner's property.99 The latter govern-
mental actions may or may not constitute a taking, depending on the out-
come of the ad hoc balancing tests that are used in regulatory takings
cases."°" Specifically, the Court in Loretto said that "[m]ore recent cases
confirm the distinction between a permanent physical occupation, a
physical invasion short of an occupation, and a regulation that merely
restricts use of property,"'0 ' and that the Court's recent cases "imply that
a physical invasion is subject to a balancing process, but they do not sug-
gest that a permanent physical occupation would ever be exempt from
the Takings Clause."1°2
96. See MELTZ, MERRIAM & FRANK, supra note 7, at 124.
97. 458 U.S. 419 (1982). In Loretto, the Supreme Court found that a taking had oc-
curred when a cable television company attached cable wires and junction boxes to a rental
building owned by Mrs. Loretto despite her objections. See id. at 438. The relevant statute
prohibited landlords from, among other things, interfering with the installation of cable
television facilities upon the landlord's property. See id. at 444-45 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing).
98. Cf. MELTZ, MERRIAM & FRANK, supra note 7, at 125.
99. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 427-28.
100. Id. at 426-27.
101. Id. at 430.
102. Id. at 432.
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This language1"3 could form the basis for an argument that a physical
occupation of a landowner's property for a term of six to eighteen
months, as in the first fact pattern presented in the introduction to this
Article, or for a term of three years, as described in the second fact pat-
tern presented in the introduction, might not constitute a taking for which
compensation must be paid because the occupation of the landowner's
real property is not permanent within the usual sense of the word. Such
an occupation would constitute a taking only if the ad hoc balancing tests
that have become common in regulatory takings cases were fulfilled.'0
4
The dissent in Loretto predicted precisely this type of confusion saying
that the majority's approach "erects a strained and untenable distinction
.. [that] 'reduces the constitutional issue to a formalistic quibble' over
whether property has been 'permanently occupied' or 'temporarily in-
vaded." 1 5
The "permanent occupation" versus "temporary invasion" distinction
has been discredited many times.1°6 The dispute was ultimately laid to
103. The above quoted language is not the only misleading language in Loretto. The
Court also stated that "a permanent physical occupation authorized by government is a
taking without regard to the public interests that it may serve." Id. at 426. This language
seems to forget that an appropriation of private land that serves no public interest is con-
stitutionally prohibited. Moreover, I suggest that "without regard to the public interests"
is errant language that generates problematic decisions such as Kelo.
104. See id. This could generate the absurd argument that if the leasehold is not "per-
manent" in the usual sense of the word, and for some reason does not constitute a taking
under the ad hoc balancing tests, then it is not a taking for which just compensation is due.
It is an affront to basic constitutional principles that real property could be occupied by the
government for the duration of a leasehold (i.e., longer than a transitory trespass) to the
exclusion of the owner, yet not require just compensation. See infra Part V.C. (discussing
Justice Thomas' dissent in Kelo).
105. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 442 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Joseph L. Sax, Tak-
ings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 37 (1964)).
106. It should be noted that the majority in Loretto cited Frank I. Michelman, Prop-
erty, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation"
Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165 (1967), finding that formal expropriation proceedings are
different from physical occupation of land and that formal expropriation presumably con-
stitutes a compensable taking. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 427 n.5. Thus, it appears that the ma-
jority would likely agree with my conclusion that government condemnation proceedings
to acquire leasehold interests for government use, such as those likely to be used in the two
hypotheticals at the beginning of this Article, would constitute a compensable per se tak-
ing.
Subsequent lower court decisions and commentators have been able to ascertain what
the Loretto Court meant, explaining that use of a landowner's real property by the gov-
ernment, or by those acting with the authority of government, for a finite term of reason-
able duration constitutes a taking without resort to the ad hoc analysis found in regulatory
takings cases. See Hendler v. United States (Hendler III), 952 F.2d 1364, 1376 (Fed. Cir.
1991); see also MELTZ, MERRIAM & FRANK, supra note 7, at 125.
In Hendler III, the government (the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) of the
federal government and the State of California acting for the federal government), acting
with legal authorization but without the landowner's consent, placed numerous groundwa-
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rest by the Supreme Court itself in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council,
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency'O° and Brown v. Legal Founda-
tion of Washington.'9 Tahoe-Sierra dealt with the claim of an association
of landowners that moratoria on development constituted a regulatory
taking of property without compensation. °9 Brown did not involve the
taking of real property."0 It dealt with a claim that rules of the Washing-
ton Supreme Court requiring limited practice officers to place clients'
funds in "interest on lawyers' trust accounts" (IOLTA accounts) violated
the claimants' First and Fifth Amendment rights."'
The court's language in Tahoe-Sierra, which was quoted at length in
Brown, clarified the Court's position as to traditional physical takings of
temporary duration, by stating:
When the government physically takes possession of an inter-
est in property for some public purpose, it has a categorical duty
to compensate the former owner, regardless of whether the inter-
ter monitoring wells on the owner's property and engaged in other activities on the
owner's land to monitor and combat groundwater pollution from the Superfund hazardous
waste site, the Stringfellow Acid Pits, located off-site but nearby. Hendler III, 952 F.2d at
1369, 1376, 1379. The landowner responded to the government's action with a claim of
inverse condemnation. Id. at 1375.
In reviewing the decision of the Court of Claims, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit found that a taking had occurred under traditional physical takings theory. Id. at
1383-84. In reaching its decision, the court directly confronted the concept of "permanent
physical occupation" found in Loretto. Id. at 1375-78. The court in Hendler III explained:
In this context, "permanent" does not mean forever, or anything like it. A taking
can be for a limited term-what is "taken" is, in the language of real property law, an
estate for years, that is, a term of finite duration as distinct from the infinite term of
an estate in fee simple absolute.
Id. at 1376. The Hendler III court also relied upon General Motors, saying that in General
Motors, "the government's appropriation of the unexpired term of a warehouse lease was a
taking; the fact that it was finite went to the determination of compensation rather than to
the question of whether a taking had occurred." Id. The Hendler III court expressed its
belief that the "temporary" versus "permanent" dispute "was not a fight over principle,
but a dispute over the illogical use of a word." Id. at 1376-77.
The Hendler case made its way between the trial court and the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit several times (Hendler l-Hendler VI). Ultimately, in Hendler VI,
the court upheld a decision of the lower court that, despite the taking, the plaintiffs were
due no compensation because the special benefits derived by plaintiffs more than offset
the value of the easements taken and their severance damages. See Hendler v. United
States (Hendler VI), 175 F.3d 1374, 1376-78, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
Likewise, in, Skip Kirchdorfer, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit stated that
"[a] 'permanent' physical occupation does not necessarily mean a taking unlimited in dura-
tion. A 'permanent' taking can have a limited term." Skip Kirchdorfer, Inc. v. United
States, 6 F.3d 1573, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citation omitted).
107. 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
108. 538 U.S. 216 (2003).
109. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 306.
110. See Brown, 538 U.S. at 228-29.
111. Id. at 227-29.
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est that is taken constitutes an entire parcel or merely a part
thereof. Thus, compensation is mandated when a leasehold is
taken and the government occupies the property for its own pur-
poses, even though that use is temporary.112
This language resolves not only the permanent occupancy versus tem-
porary invasion dispute but also confirms that the General Motors line of
cases 113 still constitutes good law and continues to enjoy the favor of the
Supreme Court.n 4 It also confirms that government's appropriation of a
leasehold for its use constitutes a traditional physical taking for which just
compensation is required under the Fifth Amendment.1 5
The foregoing discussion reveals no impediment to the use of condem-
nation proceedings to create a leasehold in any situation in which emi-
nent domain is allowable. Accordingly, condemnation proceedings could
be used in a situation like that in Kelo to create a leasehold in a private
party if enabling legislation has been enacted and there are legislative
findings establishing some public benefit. Thus, government could con-
demn a leasehold in the New London property owners' land, in either the
form of a long-term ground lease or a standard business lease, thus plac-
ing the homeowners and the private party tenants in a relationship of
landlord and tenant. This outcome, although troubling, is not beyond
comprehension; footnotes 4 and 6 in the Supreme Court's opinion note
112. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322 (citations omitted); see also Brown, 538 U.S. at 233.
Consider the Tahoe-Sierra Court's use of the phrase "public purpose" instead of "public
use" in connection with the discussion of Kelo, supra notes 22-38 and accompanying text,
as well as the implications for takings that create leaseholds, discussed infra Part V.
113. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949); United States v. Petty
Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946); United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
114. It is interesting to note the frequency with which the General Motors line of cases
has been cited in recent years. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528,537 (2005);
Brown, 538 U.S. at 233; Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322.
115. Thus, there is ample support for the conclusory statements of legal scholars that
temporary takings constitute valid takings for which the Fifth Amendment requires com-
pensation, without the necessity of wartime or other exigencies. Professors Dana and
Merrill recognize takings that are "less than total in terms of time as well as space." DANA
& MERRILL, supra note 7, at 183. They state their summary conclusion, and then immedi-
ately proceed to discuss how the concept has been used in recent case law on regulatory
takings. Id. at 183-85. Meltz, Merriam, and Frank explain that "[b]oth physical and regula-
tory takings can be permanent or temporary, partial or complete." MELTZ, MERRIAM &
FRANK, supra note 7, at 124. Professor Stoebuck mentions leaseholds within a list of vari-
ous types of interests an owner might transfer to a private party and which could therefore
constitute "property" in eminent domain. Stoebuck, supra note 7, at 605. Likewise, Nich-
ols on Eminent Domain extensively discusses the General Motors line of cases in its treat-
ment of temporary easements. See 9 ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 53, § 32.03. Because
that treatise recognizes temporary physical takings of a term for years and uses them as
guidance in the well-accepted realm of temporary easements, I would argue that the accep-
tance of temporary easements as Fifth Amendment takings within American jurisprudence
further validates takings of a term for years for more generalized use.
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that negotiations for a long-term ground lease between private develop-
ers and the government were ongoing.' 6 The only difference is that the
taking of a leasehold would place the homeowners in the role of landlord,
and the terms would not be negotiated as in a typical lease but would be
imposed and then compensated in the form of just compensation. 17
Having concluded not only that the General Motors line of cases consti-
tutes precedent of continuing viability 18 but also that creation of a lease-
hold through condemnation proceedings appears to be a fundamentally
sound legal concept under takings jurisprudence, it is appropriate to in-
quire as to the circumstances in which government ought to establish a
leasehold through condemnation proceedings.
IV. CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH GOVERNMENT SHOULD CREATE A
LEASEHOLD THROUGH CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS
The question of whether and to what extent government should engage
in condemnation proceedings to create leaseholds is a more complex and
intriguing question than whether or not government can engage in such
takings. Governments frequently acquire fee simple title to land in per-
manent and partial physical takings. 9 They regularly take temporary
easements for construction staging areas and similar temporary uses dur-
ing construction of roadways and other public improvements 20 Gov-
ernments regularly eliminate leaseholds when they take the fee simple
interest in the land that is subject to the lease.12 There are circumstances,
albeit limited, in which government should utilize condemnation pro-
116. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2660-61 nn.4, 6 (2005).
117. In circumstances in which an assemblage of land is needed for the private lessee, it
is also conceivable that government would undertake an assemblage by condemnation
proceedings to create a leasehold in each of the needed parcels, then sublease to the pri-
vate party end user. If the coerced leases impose affirmative duties on the con-
demnees/lessors, the complications inherent in this situation quickly become unworkable.
Can you imagine the burden on multiple, private, involuntary landlords of complying with
the demands of their unwanted, powerful, corporate, private lessee?
118. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
119. Sometimes the land taken in fee simple was encumbered by a leasehold, ease-
ment, or other encumbrance; in these instances, the government's taking would also take
(i.e., eliminate) the leasehold, easement, or other encumbrance. See supra notes 3-6 and
accompanying text. This is a very common occurrence in takings law. See supra note 3
and accompanying text. This Article, by contrast, and the policy discussion in Part V per-
tain to the use of condemnation to create a leasehold with the condemnor, or a private
party designated by the condemnor, as the lessee, and the condemnee as the lessor.
120. In the case of a temporary easement, the government is acquiring a less than fee
interest having certain characteristics in common with a leasehold. Cf. John D. Echever-
ria, Regulating Versus Paying Landowners to Protect the Environment, 26 J. LAND RE-
SOURCES & ENVTL. L. 1, 7 (2005).
121. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
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ceedings under its power of eminent domain in order to create a lease-
hold.
One obvious circumstance in which condemnation proceedings are ap-
propriate for creation of a leasehold is when a prospective landlord en-
gages in monopolistic behavior believing that he or she can obtain a
grossly excessive rental rate because the prospective government tenant
has no satisfactory alternative and is thought to have deep pockets.'
22
A major argument in favor of establishing a leasehold through con-
demnation, aside from the fact that it is purely an extension of eminent
domain theory in general, is that leasing, rather than purchasing real
property, may result in more prudent use of taxpayers' funds, especially
in times when governments find themselves short of cash and facing
budgetary constraints. There are instances in which government needs
immediate, short-term occupancy, especially when facilities are needed to
respond to a particular temporary situation or for community outreach
programs. Those programs are often of limited duration based on the
community's needs. For example, job retraining due to the sudden clo-
sure of a major regional ejnployer, such as that described in the introduc-
tion to this Article, is no longer necessary once dislocated employees find
other work.'3 In other instances, the need is of limited duration because
the funding or sponsor for the program, often the state or federal gov-
ernment, provides funding or program requirements based on a limited
time frame. 24 Alternatively, there may be temporary needs during the
construction or reconstruction of government-owned facilities such as the
college example provided at the beginning of the Article. Obviously,
122. I discuss this monopolistic behavior phenomena in connection with public col-
leges' and universities' efforts to purchase land in fee simple for college expansion and
discuss various alternatives, including exercise of eminent domain, in order to deal with
land speculation practices in the vicinity of growing public institutions of higher education.
In doing so, I focus on the statutory and regulatory environment of Florida. However, the
concepts are applicable on a more general basis. See generally Carol L. Zeiner, Monetary
and Regulatory Hobbling: The Acquisition of Real Property by Public Institutions of Higher
Education in Florida, 12 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 103 (2004).
123. Similarly, government may have only a temporary need for facilities to provide
short-term (hopefully) disaster relief efforts following natural disasters. In such situations,
extended negotiations with a prospective landlord could delay the delivery of services for
which there is immediate need. Brief negotiations followed by quick take condemnation if
allowed by state law, see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1013.25 (West 2004), used in conjunction
with the quick take process, such as that provided in chapter 74 of the Florida Statutes,
may prove to be the most expeditious means for government to obtain possession of facili-
ties needed immediately for relief services. See id. §§ 74.101-.111 (West 2004 & Supp.
2007).
124. Such a situation could easily arise under a federal grant to a public community
college or other public entity pursuant to which the public body will provide certain ser-
vices at various locations for the duration of the grant. Space is needed to perform the
terms of the grant; however, leasing is the most viable alternative because the need for the
space will end with the conclusion of the grant.
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126leasing will involve a smaller outlay of cash'2 than would a purchase.
Leasing also eliminates the carrying costs2'~ that will be incurred by gov-
ernment in connection with owning real property beyond the time that it
is needed, as well as the expense and possible political fallout of disposing
of government-owned property once the need ends.128 Moreover, and of
particular constitutional significance, the taking of a leasehold in appro-
priate circumstances is more consistent with constitutional concerns than
is the taking a fee simple under such circumstances. Government should
not take more property than it needs. 9 Likewise, government should not
take a greater interest in property than it needs13 Obviously, however,
before seeking to establish a leasehold through condemnation proceed-
ings, the prospective governmental lessee must determine that its needs
are of finite duration and government must do a reasonable job of deter-
mining how long the leasehold will be required.13 ' Although leasehold
125. The courts may require the payment to be made at one time at the initiation of the
leasehold. However, there may be circumstances in which periodic payments are appro-
priate, such as payments for repeated extensions of the term.
126. This assumes a short-term lease rather than a long term ground lease, which is
analogous in many ways to an outright purchase of the fee. The long-term ground lease is
a technique frequently used by developers of commercial real estate projects. See infra
notes 175-77 and accompanying text.
127. Here, I am referring to the ongoing financial outlay necessary to maintain and
secure owned property regardless of whether it is in use. If the purchase was financed by
bonds, there will be a continuing obligation of bond service, see, e.g., Rankin v. City of Fort
Smith, 990 S.W.2d 535, 536, 538 (Ark. 1999), regardless of whether the property is in use,
as well as reduction in bonding capacity. Moreover, if the government were to dispose of
the property and the condemnee no longer wanted it, there would be expenses of disposi-
tion, not to mention public skepticism of the government's wisdom in having condemned a
fee simple in the first place.
128. The property may have been previously taken in fee simple by condemnation
from an obviously unwilling seller, perhaps someone who lived on the property for most of
her life and who, by the time the government need ends, has resolved the emotional loss
and has settled into a new abode and lifestyle, only to be faced anew with emotional up-
heaval. Moreover, if government sells the land, the time of government employees, and
therefore taxpayers' money, will be expended in the advertising and bidding process that is
an inherent part of government dispositions of land. If we, as a nation, are truly interested
in reducing the size and cost of government, we must take into account, as part of the
transaction costs, the employee time that could be devoted to another task.
129. If government has no use for the property it is taking, the element of public use is
absent, and the taking should not be allowed. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S.
229, 241 (1984); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 127.01(2) (West Supp. 2007) (requiring a
"showing [of] reasonable necessity for parks, playgrounds, recreational centers, or other
recreational purposes").
130. See Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1996). On the other
hand, General Motors points out that government should not so carve up the ownership of
the property such that it takes only those "chips" that it wants, leaving the landowner with
the remaining chips that are worthless. See United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S.
373, 382 (1945).
131. See, e.g., Gen. Motors, 323 U.S. at 381.
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extensions or rights of termination are possible, 32 the costs of additional
condemnation proceedings to obtain an extension or a right to terminate
that was not sought in the original proceedings would not be an efficient
use of public funds. Moreover, government must attempt to obtain rea-
sonably suitable premises through a voluntary landlord-tenant relation-
ship. It is my position that government should not resort to condemna-
tion proceedings unless no suitable alternate location for which a lease
can be negotiated is available and government has exhausted all reason-
able possibilities for a timely bargained-for exchange.'
34
As will become evident in the discussion in Part V, I urge that condem-
nation to create a leasehold is appropriate only if government itself, or a
private party acting as an agent of government to perform duties nor-
mally performed by government, occupies the premises. Leaseholds
should not be established by condemnation for transfer to private parties
for private use in Kelo-type transfers.
Both of the circumstances described in the introduction to this Article
are appropriate instances for the use of condemnation proceedings to
create a leasehold. In the first fact pattern, the college is not using an
involuntary leasehold imposed by condemnation proceedings as an alter-
native to prudent planning. The need is an important, time-sensitive duty
of government. The public entity will occupy the premises itself. The
prerequisite attempts to find an alternate solution and to obtain premises
by negotiation have failed. A clear, short-term need is present.
In the second fact pattern, government is responding to a sudden de-
velopment: the bankruptcy and closure of a major local employer. The
situation is unexpected, the need is immediate, short-term, and impor-
tant; government will occupy the premises to provide a significant gov-
ernment service. There is no suitable alternate location, and negotiations
have failed.
132. See Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949); United States v.
Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372,375 n.8 (1946).
133. Not only does this make sense from the perspective of fiscally responsible behav-
ior but it is sometimes required by statute. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 73.015(1), 1013.25
(West 2004).
134. I come to this conclusion because of the serious problems that can be generated
by condemnation proceedings to establish a leasehold, because of the injury such takings
occasion on the individual autonomy of the condemnee, and because of the economic cost
of condemnation proceedings. See infra Part V. Although the number of instances in
which a leasehold to be established through condemnation is the best solution for govern-
ment ought to be comparatively few in number, it is likely that many of those occasions
will arise because the premises are needed immediately. This will necessitate govern-
ment's use of quick take condemnation proceedings in which government will be unable to
terminate the proceedings if the measurement of just compensation is too high. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 74.031 (West 2004). Thus, government should treat the cost of con-
demnation as a disincentive.
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Although I contend that each of these situations is appropriate for the
use of condemnation proceedings to establish the badly needed govern-
ment leasehold, each situation nevertheless creates significant problems
for the condemnee. Although it might be comparatively simple to calcu-
late the rent, level of services, and common area expenses under the first
fact pattern because the college is already a tenant in the building, there
likely are reasons, other than mean-spiritedness, that motivated the col-
lege's landlord to refuse to extend the college's lease.135 Perhaps it was
the fact that students congregate and socialize in common areas, generate
greater wear and tear on a building due to the sheer number of individu-
als using the premises, and impose greater demands on elevators, rest-
rooms, parking, cleaning, and security than would the lower number of
persons who would occupy the space under a typical office space lease.
Moreover, it is well-known that parking is a perennial problem in the
college setting. Perhaps the landlord made a strategic business decision
to change the character of the building and had attracted new, traditional,
office tenants on the strength of the fact that the college's lease was ex-
piring and that the unconventional use of the office building would cease.
In the second situation described in the introduction, the terms of the
lease (i.e., the types and level of services to be provided by the con-
demnee lessor) are unknown. Moreover, the entire business plan of the
shopping center, and likely its income, as well as that of other tenants,
will be adversely impacted for the next three years, and likely beyond."'
While tenant leases typically contain provisions dealing with partial con-
demnation of the property, the government leasehold may still precipi-
tate the breach of the landlord's covenants such as tenant mix and use of
the shopping center. Unlike a partial taking in fee simple, in which the
changes are permanent and the various parties impacted can readjust
their respective positions and seek permanent solutions, the government
leasehold is temporary, greatly complicating the situation among all af-
fected parties.
135. Aside from the fact that the hypothetical expressly states that the landlord "will
not extend lease on any terms," it is likely that a prudent governmental entity would offer
an increased rent prior to initiating costly and adversarial eminent domain proceedings.
136. I specifically point out that the reduction in income may extend beyond the dura-
tion of the leasehold because consumer attitudes and habits are important aspects of the
retail business. If customers stop coming to the condemnee's shopping center because
parking is unavailable due to the government usage, or because the remaining retail areas
in the shopping center have too few customers (because too much of the parking is occu-
pied by government customers) to generate the festive, convivial atmosphere that is typi-
cally present at a popular shopping destination, those customers will go elsewhere and
develop other shopping habits. Once they have found another preferred destination, it will
be difficult to attract them to return to the condenee's shopping center when the gov-
ernment leasehold expires.
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Thus, the government's taking of a leasehold generates problems even
in these two straightforward examples of situations in which the appro-
priateness of creating a leasehold is unambiguous. The next part of this
Article shows that the problems can go far beyond those mentioned
above. It also recommends solutions.
V. CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS THAT ESTABLISH LEASEHOLDS:
PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
A. Introduction
Despite the existence of circumstances in which the use of condemna-
tion proceedings to establish a government leasehold is the best solution
to an important need,37 the use of eminent domain for such purposes is
fraught with objections, complications, and serious concerns. The prob-
lems are both practical and philosophical. Some are unique to the use of
condemnation proceedings to establish leaseholds. Others are identical
to those that have been expressed in connection with eminent domain in
general; however, they take on heightened importance with respect to
takings to create leaseholds because of the special circumstances in-
volved. The magnitude and severity of these concerns lead to the conclu-
sion that, as a matter of public policy, government should engage in such
takings only in certain limited circumstances. Therefore, the law ought to
be altered to narrow the circumstances in which takings to establish
leaseholds are permissible and also cost-effective for government. This
section explores the objections, concerns, and possible solutions.
B. Practical and Economic Objections
1. Leasing Is More Costly over the Long Term
Among the objections to the use of condemnation to obtain a leasehold
is the argument that leasing is more expensive in the long term as com-
pared to purchasing, because leasing involves a landlord who seeks to
make a profit from leasing.38 While it is true that landlords typically en-
ter into the enterprise of leasing real property in order to make a profit,
the question of whether leasing or buying is more prudent turns on the
137. See discussion supra Part III (establishing the legality of such action when ana-
lyzed solely on legal principles); see also discussion supra Part IV (describing the recom-
mended parameters of when government ought to establish a leasehold through eminent
domain).
138. This argument arises because market value rental, which generally arises in the
context of business enterprise undertaken for profit, is the most common measure of just
compensation for a temporary taking. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 323
U.S. 373, 379 (1945).
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economics of the particular situation.139 Basically, the shorter the dura-
tion, the less the amount of taxpayers' money that must be dedicated to
the particular transaction. If government has done a good job of deter-
mining that its needs are of finite duration and it has done a reasonable
job of estimating that duration, including contingencies, leasing can be
more cost-conscious, especially if the need is clearly short term.
2. Government Needs Never End; Government Cannot Accurately De-
termine Its Short- Term Needs
Another argument that may be raised is that once government acquires
use of real property, its needs never end,' ° and that by acquiring a lease-
hold, government is merely delaying the inevitable and will eventually
have to purchase the property at a subsequent date when its price has• . 141
appreciated. In response to this argument, first, I am not suggesting
that establishing a leasehold through condemnation is appropriate in
every instance; 42 nor should governments forego acquisitions of fee sim-
ple interests in favor of condemning leaseholds where acquisition of a fee
simple is the best solution to a particular government need. The fact that
this option is not suitable in many situations should not be determinative
of whether it is available for use in a different, more appropriate situa-
tion. Even if there are comparatively few occasions in which condemning
a leasehold is appropriate, I contend that governments should use this
alternative when it is the best solution for specific government needs.
Government should include consideration of condemning a leasehold
when it examines the various alternatives available in any given situation.
Second, I would respond that government is capable of calculating the
duration of short-term projects. However, the estimates cannot be politi-
cally expedient projections or made without careful consideration of all
the variables.
139. Typically, government does not pay income taxes; thus, the issue of deductibility
of rent payments and similar income tax issues are not among the issues to be considered.
140. This position, possibly a little jaded, reflects a viewpoint that government is an
ever-expanding entity incapable of controlling itself. Unfortunately, government behaves
in this manner often enough to create an arguable basis for the viewpoint.
141. Another variation of this argument is that government projects tend to take so
much longer (and cost so much more) than originally projected (for an example from the
realm of government construction projects, consider the infamous Boston tunnel project)
that the government will either have to buy the property because its needs were actually
permanent, or nearly so, or the government will have to extend the leasehold, possibly
incurring the expense of another condemnation proceeding.
142. Quite to the contrary, I refer the reader to the special limitations described in Part
V of this Article. See discussion infra Part V.C.3.
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3. Irresponsible Planning
An especially important concern is that the availability of condemna-
tion proceedings to create leaseholds will promote government slothful-
ness and irresponsible planning14'3 because government can rely on emi-
nent domain proceedings as a quick fix rather than engaging in careful,
timely planning to accomplish a permanent solution to a need for facili-
ties. I do not believe that this is currently a problem. Unfortunately, I
believe that it is not currently a problem merely because the idea of using
eminent domain to acquire a leasehold is not typically one of the alterna-
tives that comes to the attention of government. Under current law, the
technique could become fertile ground for government abuse.144 As will
become evident in Part V of this Article, it is my recommendation that
the availability of leaseholds created through condemnation be limited.
Although my recommendations will tend to curb abuse, the possibility of
slothful government is not my primary reason for the recommended limi-
tations. Unfortunately, even if the recommended limitations are
adopted, fiscally wasteful behavior will still be possible, even if it is lim-
ited. Nonetheless, this is not an appropriate reason to forbid the creation
of leaseholds by eminent domain in appropriate circumstances. 
145
143. Evaluation of this possible concern was suggested by higher education scholar
Professor Michael Olivas whose extensive understanding of various government processes
and helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article improved the final work product.
144. This is especially true where government has quick take eminent domain statutes
available. A quick take eminent domain process enables government to immediately con-
demn and take possession of property with just compensation to be determined at a later
date. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 74.01-.111 (West 2004 & Supp. 2007). Thus, slothful gov-
ernmental officials guilty of poor planning through their failure to formulate an appropri-
ate solution to a long-term need for facilities could escape the initial consequences of a
facilities dilemma of their own creation by engaging in brief negotiations with a landlord
followed by quick take eminent domain proceedings if those negotiations, possibly heavy-
handed, are not successful. Once government has engaged in quick take eminent domain,
government must pay whatever compensation is set at the ultimate end of the judicial
proceedings. See id. § 74.031 (West 2004). By comparison, depending on the wording of
the jurisdiction's regular eminent domain statutes (sometimes referred to as a "slow take"
process when being compared to quick take statutes), government can decline to complete
the taking if the compensation is too high. Cf. id. §§ 74.01-.111 (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).
Having foregone that precaution, slothful government officials could be wasteful with
taxpayers' money. The longer the leasehold, the greater the expense and possible waste,
yet the more likely that these particular wasteful officials could complete their terms of
office before the fiscal consequences of their slothfulness become apparent to the public.
145. The limitations I recommend will thwart some instances of abuse because an in-
ept, disingenuous government would not be able to impose a private lessee on the con-
demnee/lessor; but, unfortunately, inept government is always a possibility. Moreover,
elimination of all leaseholds established by condemnation will not prevent poor govern-
ment planning. Government would merely enter into consensual leases at exorbitant rates
or enter into far more costly permanent physical takings. Thus, this is not a good reason to
totally eliminate condemnation to create leaseholds. The best solution to government
waste is transparent governmental affairs and vigilant voters.
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4. The Exception Might Swallow the Typical; Practical Hardships for
Property Owners
Another concern that is particular to condemnations that create lease-
holds is that government might rely on takings creating leaseholds and
discontinue takings of fee simple interests, thus swallowing what pres-
ently is the typical situation within the exception, to the detriment of
property owners. Far from swallowing the more common taking of a fee
simple, physical takings that create leaseholds through condemnation
proceedings appear so rare that very little is written about them. This,
however, does not eliminate the possibility that if establishment of lease-
holds through condemnation proceedings becomes popular, unique chal-
lenges will be presented. Some of these challenges will be quite serious.
For instance, the property owner can have a reversion but possess insuffi-
cient funds to acquire replacement property. Another possible complica-
tion is that under some circumstances, it might be difficult to ameliorate
the loss of occupancy and usage of one's property through the leasing of a
temporary replacement site. 46
One could argue that government's taking of a leasehold is, in some re-
spects, less of an invasion of the condemnee's property rights than taking
a fee simple because in the leasehold situation, the condemnee retains the
reversion and, at the end of the lease term, will regain the possessory
interest in the fee.
This, however, can be a two-edged sword. In one respect, the con-
demnee's rights in property are respected because the condemnee con-
tinues to own the fee and will regain full control of the property at the
end of the leasehold. The shorter the taking, the more the statement in
the preceding paragraph will be true. However, the finite duration of the
taking also impacts the condemnee's flexibility in obtaining replacement
property for the duration of the taking. If the government leasehold in-
cludes rights to extend or terminate its leasehold147 and the condemnee
plans to return to the property when the temporary taking ends, the con-
demnee may need to negotiate similar terms in its acquisition of an inter-
est in other property, often a leasehold, to serve as the condemnee's
home or business for the duration of the taking. While the government
can dictate the durational terms of the taking, the condemnee does not
146. A solution to the economic aspect of these problems is discussed infra Part V.B.5.
Although these problems seem at first glance to be economic, they also foreshadow the
philosophical concerns discussed infra Part V.C.
147. Looking at government need as a former attorney for a political subdivision, I
would generally recommend that the government taking include rights of early termination
and rights to extend the duration of the leasehold so that the government can meet unex-
pected circumstances, like construction delays caused by hurricanes, strikes, late delivery
of materials, or unanticipated site conditions, without having to incur the expense of fur-
ther condemnation proceedings.
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have such power and must negotiate such terms with its temporary land-
lord. The condemnee's landlord can impose additional charges for these
terms.
148
5. More Practical/Economic Issues and a Solution: The Measurement of
Just Compensation
Some critics might utilize these realities to argue that the creation of a
leasehold through condemnation proceedings should not be allowed.
The response to such an objection is that some of these difficulties are
inherent in eminent domain in general; the temporary right to the use
and occupancy of real property is merely another type of interest in
property that is subject to the eminent domain power of government as
limited by the Takings Clause.149 As currently formulated, just compensa-
tion is not intended to cover every loss that a condemnee may suffera °
However, the unique losses attributable to temporary physical takings
through condemnation proceedings can be addressed to a large extent via
adjustments to the measurement of just compensation for such takings. 5'
In fact, the Court's precedents for temporary physical takings provide
likely solutions for the particular problems previously mentioned in
leasehold situations. In General Motors, the condemnee was a long-term
tenant; the United States was, by virtue of its taking, creating a sub-
lease.12 The Court found that the value of the government's occupancy,
and therefore the just compensation to be paid to the condemnee, was
"the market rental value of such [property interest] by the long-term ten-
148. It is more likely than not that such additional charges will be imposed. They may
appear as separate costs to the condemnee lessee or factors in the calculation of rent be-
cause the temporary landlord's stream of income and its ability to plan for the future will
be impacted by the condemnee lessee's early termination or extension of the lease.
149. See discussion supra Part III. In addition, it should be noted that in takings of a
fee simple interest, the government typically does not pay losses to the condemnee's busi-
ness or other consequential damages, unless the enabling legislation so requires (some do,
but this is a matter of legislative decision rather than constitutional obligation). See Kim-
ball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1949); United States v. General Motors
Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 379-80 (1945). In such situations, the condemnee may not be made
whole. It has been said that just compensation is the means of spreading the loss among all
citizens so that one property owner does not bear a disproportional share of the cost of
government. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); see also Stoebuck,
supra note 7, at 587; William Michael Treanor, The Armstrong Principle, the Narratives of
Takings, and Compensation Statutes, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1151 (1997).
150. See sources cited supra note 149.
151. I reiterate that neither the elimination of the condemnation of leaseholds nor
changes in the calculation of just compensation will prevent inept government. See supra
note 145. The changes in the calculation of just compensation that I recommend will serve
as a disincentive for too frequent reliance on the condemnation of leaseholds and will help
to ameliorate some of the special harms that can accrue to property owners whose real
property is subject to condemnation that creates a leasehold.
152. Gen. Motors, 323 U.S. at 374-75.
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ant to the temporary occupier."'53 Accordingly, the reasonable cost of
removing the condemnee's property stored on the premises and prepar-
ing the space for occupancy by the subtenant"u should be considered "not
as independent items of damage but to aid in the determination of what
would be the usual-the market-price which would be asked and paid
for such temporary occupancy of the building."'55 Although it can be
argued that General Motors involved a government sublease from a long-
term tenant and is therefore distinguishable from situations in which the
condemnee is the owner of the fee, I believe the better position is that
such elements are valid components in the determination of market value
when a leasehold is carved from the fee through eminent domain in order
to avoid the problem identified by the Court in General Motors. In Gen-
eral Motors, the Court recognized that if government could
by the form of its proceeding chop[ a condemnee's fee simple]
into bits, of which it takes only what it wants ... leav[ing] him
holding the remainder, which may then be altogether useless to
him, refusing to pay more than the "market rental value" for the
use of the chips so cut off... [it could defeat] the "just compensa-
tion" [that] the Fifth Amendment contemplates.
While elaboration on the intricacies of just compensation for leaseholds
created by condemnation proceedings is beyond the scope of this Article,
the general approach can be outlined here. A fee owner who must vacate
space that he needs, and is then using, in order to make that space avail-
able to a short-term tenant would take the cost of temporary replacement
space into consideration when setting the rent for the space to be va-
cated. Thus, analogous to the reasoning in General Motors, the reason-
able cost of such arrangements should be considered in determining the
fair market price.57 This will, in most instances, eliminate the problem
referred to above in which the condmenee might have a reversion, but
insufficient funds to acquire appropriate temporary replacement prop-
erty. It will likewise address the problem in which the condemnee might
have to pay a higher rent to negotiate terms in his replacement lease that
will dovetail with those in the government's taking.
Kimball Laundry provides an avenue to address the loss of goodwill
that can accompany the condemnee's loss of a business location for the
153. Id. at 382. "[M]arket value" is the usual measure of just compensation under the
Fifth Amendment. See id. at 379.
154. These costs, the Court said, "would include labor, materials, and transportation,"
and "might also include the storage of goods against their sale or the cost of their return to
the leased premises." Id. at 383.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 382.
157. Id. at 383.
158. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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duration of the temporary taking. In Kimball Laundry, the Court noted
that while the loss of business goodwill is not typically compensated when
a fee simple interest is taken, it was nonetheless appropriate to compen-
sate the condemnee for the loss of "trade routes," the equivalent of busi-
ness goodwill in the laundry business, that occurred by virtue of the tem-
porary taking. 9 The Court explained that goodwill is not compensated
when a fee simple is taken because the condemnee can establish a new
permanent location from which to operate its business.' 60 However, in
Kimball Laundry's situation, goodwill was recoverable, if proven on re-
mand, because of the temporary nature of the taking.161 While it can be
argued that the condemnee in Kimball Laundry was compensated be-
cause the government's taking of its laundry business put the condemnee
out of business for the duration of the temporary taking, one can also
argue quite convincingly that a temporary taking of a location to which
goodwill is associated cannot be remedied in the same way as a perma-
nent taking because the condemnee may not be in a position to establish
a new permanent site to which its goodwill can be attached and reestab-
lished because the situation is merely temporary. Moreover, the business
owner condemnee will most likely incur business disruption and loss of
goodwill associated with its return to its original site at the end of the
term of the leasehold. Although it is arguable that the condemnee could
establish a new permanent location rather than returning, this is highly
unlikely because the compensation for a short-term taking will not be
sufficient to permit acquisition of a new permanent site in fee. Thus,
these are damages particular to a temporary physical taking that ought to
be compensated as an additional element of just compensation under
reasoning similar to that in Kimball Laundry.1
62
Thus, many practical objections to the creation of a leasehold in gov-
ernment through eminent domain proceedings can be addressed through
the measurement of just compensation, and objections such as those de-
scribed above are not valid reasons to prohibit the establishment of a
leasehold in government through condemnation proceedings. Rather,
they are arguments that suggest that takings to create leaseholds have
special features meriting special solutions that can be derived from
159. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 9, 16 (1949).
160. Id. at 11-12.
161. Id. at 14-16.
162. It should be noted that in a case in which the condemnee relocates and operates
from a temporary location, the amount payable for the consequent reduction in the value
of goodwill may be less than the amount compensable when the condemnee is put entirely
out of business for the duration of the temporary taking as was the situation in Kimball
Laundry. See id. at 3.
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changes in the law concerning the measurement of just compensation.' 63
At this juncture, it is important to point out that just compensation, even
if modified as I have suggested thus far, will not fully compensate a con-
demnee for its economic losses.'6 In addition, there will be losses, which
although theoretically recoverable, might not be recoverable in specific
instances because they are speculative. Moreover, just compensation as
presently configured in eminent domain does not reimburse the personal
losses that relate to the subjective value to the condemnee of the site
taken.
There are further complications inherent in the creation of a long-term
leasehold in the government condemnor. For some property owners,
there will be no practical difference between a taking of a long-term
leasehold and the taking of fee simple title. For example, to an elderly
homeowner in her late eighties, a twenty-year lease is the equivalent of a
permanent taking of her land.'6' A small business owner can be harmed
by the loss of goodwill occasioned by loss of a valuable, well-known loca-
tion for fifteen years, a duration longer than the short-term mentioned
above. Given the significant duration of the taking when compared to
the life of a business enterprise, does that business owner abandon the
old location entirely and establish the business at a new location and be-
gin to accumulate goodwill based on the new location?' 66 Will the "mar-
ket value" measurement of just compensation payable because of the
condemnation be sufficient to pay for the new location while the con-
demnee continues to carry the location in which the condemnee owns the
reversion? Arguably both the elderly homeowner and business owner
163. Further research and work in this area is needed. The calculation of just compen-
sation under these circumstances is likely to produce some intriguing questions. The tak-
ing of a leasehold in part of a multi-tenant project can cause considerable "collateral dam-
age." The exact extent to which such collateral damage should be compensated is but one
of these intriguing questions. It is not unusual for scholars to recommend revisions to just
compensation. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Kelo and the Local Political Process, 34 HOF-
STRA L. REv. 13, 14 (2005); Merrill, supra note 14, at 64-66; Treanor, supra note 149, at
1155-56.
164. Rather, the result will be in keeping with the principle enunciated in Armstrong
that "[t]he Fifth Amendment's guarantee ... was designed to bar Government from forc-
ing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole." Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
Moreover, economic damages, such as damage to goodwill or profits can be difficult to
establish.
165. Thus, perhaps it is necessary to consider a further adjustment to just compensation
to include demoralization costs in takings to create a leasehold. Such an adjustment would
ameliorate the "'fiscal illusion' under which condeninors tend to operate. See Talley,
supra note 28, at 766-67.
166. Perhaps just compensation should be adjusted for loss of goodwill in such circum-
stances. See id. at 766-68.
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can sell the fee simple subject to the leasehold,'67 or sell the reversion.
In the first instance, the amount to be realized from such a sale depends
on the value of the income stream and reversion; in the second, it de-
pends on the value of the reversion alone.' 69 Thus, whether just compen-
sation-with or without a sale of the condemnee's remaining interest in
the condemned property-is sufficient to enable the homeowner or busi-
ness owner to obtain suitable replacement premises depends on how just
compensation is calculated. While these problems can be addressed to a
significant extent through the modifications to just compensation de-
scribed above, it is important that the modifications be further adjusted in
light of the duration of the temporary taking.7 '
Yet another problem arises when one considers that takings are likely
to occur in economically depressed areas. ' The inadequacy of just com-
167. In this instance, the condemnee would sell the fee and the income stream associ-
ated with the taking.
168. This would encompass the value of the reversion without the income stream.
Another problem is especially important in the case of the elderly homeowner whose ac-
cumulated appreciation in her residence is her primary asset. Our elderly homeowner may
have planned to sell her home to pay for long-term care or other needs. The situation, and
particularly her ability to obtain full compensation, may be greatly, and adversely, im-
pacted.
169. The latter is the case if the landowner sells only the reversion and keeps the just
compensation.
170. Discussion of adjustments to the calculation of just compensation to remedy per-
ceived wrongs in the eminent domain of fee simple interests are not unheard of. See supra
note 163. Professor Gillette, who is supportive of the outcome in Kelo, would address the
critics' concerns through modifications to just compensation in takings for economic de-
velopment. Gillette, supra note 163, at 20-21. Brett Talley, a critic of Kelo, recommends
that we adjust to the outcome of that case by modifying just compensation to "reinvest the
Just Compensation Clause with the deterrent effect originally intended, lest legislatures
employ eminent domain with increased frequency and economic inefficiency." Talley,
supra note 28, at 765. If Talley's argument with respect to takings of fee simple interests
were to be extended to takings that establish leaseholds, I believe that he would suggest
that the demoralization costs, such as those impacting the eighty-year-old homeowner
described above, could be monetized "using the same mechanism as is currently utilized to
award compensation for emotional harm in tort cases." Id. at 768. Talley also suggests
that government be required to provide a substitute location. Id. Such a remedy might be
particularly helpful in a taking that creates a leasehold in government. Such an adjustment
alone, however, would not address loss of business goodwill; another adjustment to just
compensation would be needed for this loss.
Professor Treanor, in a pre-Kelo article, recommended an adjustment in just compensa-
tion if the property taken represented substantially all of the condemnee's assets. See
Treanor, supra note 149, at 1155-56. While this is an interesting suggestion, I believe that a
considerable amount of work needs to be done to prevent manipulation by condemnees
who are not intended to benefit from such an adjustment.
171. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 28-29 (1954). It should be noted, how-
ever, that the area to be taken by eminent domain in Kelo could not be characterized as
blighted. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2660 (2005). But see Marc B. Mi-
haly, Public-Private Redevelopment Partnerships and the Supreme Court: Kelo v. City of
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pensation to property owners in economically depressed areas, in which
fee simple is taken by eminent domain, is a problem of continuing con-172
cern. It is possible that the taking of a leasehold could exacerbate the
problem."' These special characteristics of the establishment of a lease-
hold by eminent domain further justify the limitations on creation of
leaseholds through condemnation that I propose in the section of this
Article on philosophical concerns.174
Long-term ground leases are often used by developers and others to
obtain use and control of land that is, in many respects, the functional
equivalent of ownership. If government were to adopt a course of ac-
tion in which it no longer takes fee simple interests but takes only long-
term ground leases, what is the impact on the condemnee? I believe that
under current law, government could take such action. The impact on
the condemnee from a financial perspective depends on the measurement
176of just compensation, and again, I recommend modifications to just
compensation as described above so that the condemnee will not be
placed in an untenable position. If either a traditional lease or a ground
New London, 7 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 41, 54 (2006), http://www.vjel.org/articles.php?vols=2005-
2006.
172. See Mihaly, supra note 171, at 56-57 (recognizing that urban renewal projects were
once nicknamed "'Negro Removal"' projects); see also Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2686-87 (Tho-
mas, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that urban renewal was known as "Negro removal").
Professor Mihaly maintains that this is no longer the case for a number of reasons. While I
agree that some progress has been made, I suggest that further modification is needed
because redevelopment projects still disproportionately benefit the wealthy and politically
influential, while those deprived of their property are those lacking wealth and influence,
often minorities. An ironic aspect of Kelo is that the adversity seems to have reached the
middle class; perhaps this, in part, explains the outcry. Professor Treanor attributes some
of the success of the property rights movement to its ability to arouse the concern of the
middle class by telling the stories of ordinary citizens, many of whom are middle class, who
suffer staggering losses due to government regulation. Treanor, supra note 149, at 1161-62.
The dialectic suggested by these arguments, although fascinating, is beyond the scope of
this Article.
173. While an adjustment to just compensation such as requiring government to pro-
vide comparable substitute premises would assist with the economic impact, philosophical
concerns still exist.
174. See discussion infra Part V.C.
175. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 28, at 492-93. However, there would be certain tax
advantages such as deductibility of the ground rent.
176. In South Florida, it is not unusual that the heirs or devisees of landowners who
leased their beachfront land in the 1930s-1950s under long-term ground leases find the rent
to be shockingly inadequate when compared to today's ground lease rental rates. Inter-
view with Anthony R. Parrish, Jr., Commercial Real Estate Broker, Miami-Dade County,
Fla. (Sept. 2006). Even if rent escalation provisions are included in the calculation of just
compensation (and under the status quo, there is no assurance that this will be the out-
come of the condemnation proceedings or that the capitalization rate will be appropriate
in calculating the present value of ground rent) this remains a distinct possibility. See
discussion infra Part V.C (discussing philosophical concerns).
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lease is such that it approximates a permanent taking of a fee simple, can
a court find that there has been a constructive taking of the fee and direct
the governmental entity to provide just compensation accordingly?' 7
The magnitude and severity of these problems suggest philosophical
concerns, as well as practical and economic issues. The discussion that
follows shows that policy-level solutions, as well as adjustments to the
measurement of just compensation, are needed.
C. Philosophical Concerns
1. Some Philosophical Objections
Thus far, this Article has examined economic concerns, many of which
can be addressed to a substantial extent through modifications to the
calculation of just compensation. However, there are also philosophical,
policy-level concerns that are critical in reaching an adequate solution.
These philosophical concerns arise when establishment of leaseholds
through condemnation proceedings are examined against the significance
of the ownership of property and its fundamental role in Americans'
sense of personal dignity and freedom. The involuntary nature of the
relationship imposed on landowners by virtue of the taking is the primary
cause of the concerns.
My expertise is in real property law and higher education law; I do not
pretend expertise in constitutional law. Nevertheless, constitutional con-
cerns are implicated, and some basic consideration of the topic is needed
to highlight the philosophical issues. While I leave to experts sophisti-
cated discussion of various views on constitutional theory applicable to
eminent domain, I recognize a version of the old adage, "where there is
smoke, there might well be fire." Given the level of public outcry with
respect to the Court's decision in Kelo,78 there are likely some critical,
policy-level concerns that ought to be considered in connection with the
creation of leaseholds through condemnation proceedings.
I begin Part V.C.1. with objections that have been expressed as to the
current status of the law of eminent domain, in general, and then theorize
how they might be extended to the use of condemnation proceedings to
create leaseholds.
In Property as a Human Right,'79 an article grounded in natural law,
Professor Levy emphasizes the importance of individual property rights
to liberty and the proper functioning of democracy: "Political democracy
177. See discussion infra part V.C.II.
17& See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
179. Leonard W. Levy, Property as a Human Right, 5 CONST. COMMENT. 169 (1988).
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cannot function without job-holding, property-owning, masterless citi-
zens." '8' Referring to the "founding generation," he notes:
They regarded property as a basic human right, essential to one's
existence, to one's independence, to one's dignity as a person.
Without property, real and personal, one could not enjoy life or
liberty, and could not be free and independent.... Americans
cared about property not because they were materialistic but be-
cause they cared about political freedom and personal independ-
ence. They cherished property rights as prerequisites for the pur-
suit of happiness, and property opened up a world of intangible
values-human dignity, self-regard, self-expression, and personal
fulfillment 8
Professor Levy argues that individual property rights are no less impor-
tant today and that an individual's rights in property constitute a funda-
mental human right for which he argues that the rational basis test is in-
appropriate.'8 He asserts, "[s]trict judicial scrutiny is called for when
personal rights of property are at issue."'&3 He concludes:
180. Id. at 175.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 183. The impetus for Professor Levy's article was the Supreme Court's
decision in City of New Orleans v. Dukes. Id. at 169. Nancy Dukes was deprived of her
right to pursue her livelihood by virtue of a local economic ordinance that banned all
pushcart vendors in the French Quarter, except those operated by their owners for at least
eight years. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 298-99 (1976) (per curiam). The
Court deferred to the local legislative determinations and upheld the regulation against the
challenge that it violated the Equal Protection Clause, finding that the ordinance was
merely an economic regulation. See id. at 303. Professor Levy pointed out that "[t]he
government regulation need only have some rational basis as a means of achieving some
police power end. If an economic right is involved, the Court never questions the reason-
ableness of the government's means." Levy, supra note 179, at 170. Professor Levy fur-
ther argues that "[t]he rational basis test, used only when property rights are concerned
and never for other rights, is inadequate." Id. at 171. Professor Levy expands his proposi-
tions beyond the right to pursue a livelihood, to the individual ownership of property in
general. Id. at 175 (stating that "[p]rivate property owned by individuals, not corporations,
is the bulwark of a free society"). Professor Levy goes on to discuss eminent domain and
what he described as "judicial irresponsibility" that gave way "to judicial abdication,"
culminating in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), and Hawaii
Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). Levy, supra note 179, at 179. (Levy's
article predated Kelo by years.) Levy criticizes the Court's description in PruneYard of
"the public right to regulate the use of property [as being] as fundamental as the right to
property itself." Id. at 179-80. With respect to Midkiff, Levy decries the Court's equating
public use with public purpose and "equating the police power with the power of eminent
domain." Id. at 180-81. He points out that this ultimately led the Court in Midkiff to allow
the state to "do the very thing that Justice Paterson had said it could not do-take prop-
erty from one citizen, even at a just compensation, and give it to another at that price." Id.
at 180.
183. Levy, supra note 179, at 183. It is important to understanding Professor's Levy's
thesis to keep in mind that he focuses on the rights of natural persons in property. See id.
at 169. In reaching his conclusion, Levy notes with approval language used by the Court in
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No principled reason exists for the Court's refusal to ask
whether a statute curtailing personal rights in property is in fact a
significant means of achieving a legitimate [governmental] objec-
tive, and whether it achieves that objective without unnecessarily
burdening private rights. There is no legitimate basis for perfunc-
tory scrutiny in such cases. Property owned by people should be
accorded the same constitutional respect that courts give to other
civil or human rights so essential to the pursuit of happiness.
T8
Thus, based on his conclusion that an individual's ownership of real
property is as fundamental a civil and human right in the United States as
the right to free speech, the right to travel, and the right to privacy,85 Pro-
fessor Levy contends that governmental deprivation of a natural person's
real property requires strict scrutiny by the courts. 8'
In The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation
Clause of the Fifth Amendment7 Professor Treanor notes that by the
time the Constitution was written, non-republican, liberal political phi-
losophy had developed among some key figures, James Madison among
a plurality decision in which the Court found a violation of due process where a woman's
savings account was garnished without notice or a chance to be heard, stating that Justice
Stewart observed:
"[T]he dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is a false one. Prop-
erty does not have rights. People have rights. The right to enjoy property without
unlawful deprivation, no less than the right to speak or the right to travel, is in truth a
'personal' right, whether the 'property' in question be a welfare check, a home, or a
savings account ....
... That rights in property are basic civil rights has long been recognized."
Id. at 184 (alteration in original) (quoting Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538,
552 (1972)).
184. Id. at 184. Some of these thoughts are reflected in language of the lower courts in
Kelo. See Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 528-29 & n.39 (Conn. 2004), afJ'd,
125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). Given the date of Professor Levy's work, 1988, this is a long-
standing debate that continues and is evident in the five-to-four outcome in Kelo.
185. The notion of property as a human right finds support in the international com-
munity in a number of human rights agreements, among them the aspirational documents
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, at Article 17 thereof. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 17,
G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12,
1948).
186. Levy, supra note 179, at 183. The current level of scrutiny is much like the ra-
tional basis test used in economic regulations; the test currently used in takings cases is that
"'the legislature's purpose is legitimate and its means are not irrational."' Kelo, 125 S. Ct.
at 2667 (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242). In other words, a taking meets the public use
standard provided "it is 'rationally related to a conceivable public purpose."' Id at 2669
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241). Justice Kennedy concedes
that the standard of review of public use in Fifth Amendment takings cases "echoes the
rational-basis test used to review economic regulation under the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses." Id.
187. William Michael Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694 (1985).
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them.8 The development was based in part on growing distrust of legis-
latures because of their demonstrated misuse of power.' 9 Treanor ob-
serves that "[n]on-republicans had a more expansive view than republi-
cans of which rights could not be undermined by the state. They sought
to create a large sphere within which the individual could exercise privi-
leges and enjoy immunities free from state interference."' 9 While there
is little legislative history on the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment,'91 Professor Treanor asserts that Madison intended the Just Com-
pensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment "to have broad moral implica-
tions as a statement of national commitment to the preservation of prop-
erty rights."' 92 Thus, Professor Treanor, too, arrives at the conclusion
that individual property rights were intended as highly significant rights
deserving of special protection under the Constitution.'9 3
Concern for constitutional principles, the loss of which endangers
property rights and democracy, was at the heart of Justice O'Connor's
dissent in Kelo. 94 Justice O'Connor reminds us that every word in the
Constitution has independent meaning.9 ' Justice O'Connor states that
"the Fifth Amendment's language . . . impose[s] two distinct conditions
on the exercise of eminent domain: 'the taking must be for a "public use"
and "just compensation" must be paid to the owner. ' ' 96 Further, Justice
188. Id. at 704-05.
189. See id. at 704. Treanor contends: "Once the state legislatures came to rule in their
own right... social divisions that had been masked during the struggle with royal gover-
nors were exposed." Id. According to Treanor, "legislatures began to take actions with
.. redistributive consequences," such as confiscating loyalists' land and enactments that
"aided debtors at the expense of creditors." Id. (concluding that "[l]oss of faith in legisla-
tures was common"). Professor Treanor also notes that "[t]he inclusion of just compensa-
tion clauses in the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 and the Northwest Ordinance of
1787 took place against th[e] backdrop of fear of legislatures and heightened concern for
individual rights[, and cloncern about the potential for legislative attacks on property...
particularly... in Massachusetts." Id. at 706.
190. Id. at 705 (footnote omitted).
191. DANA & MERRILL, supra note 7, at 10-16.
192. Treanor, supra note 187, at 708. Professor Treanor additionally states that "Madi-
son did not believe property was a natural right-it depended for its existence on positive
law." Id. at 710.
193. See id. at 705; see also Talley, supra note 28, at 765.
194. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2672 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). It
cannot be concluded, however, that the majority in this five-to-four decision sought to
trample or ignore constitutional principles. Debate over the Public Use Clause has been a
"hot topic" and the subject of discussion with varying levels of intensity over the years.
See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 14, at 83; Stoebuck, supra note 7, at 553-55.
195. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2672 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Wright v. United States,
302 U.S. 583, 588 (1938)).
196. Id. at 2672 (quoting Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 231-32 (2003)).
As an example of the debate, Professor Stoebuck points out that grammatically, the lan-
guage of the Fifth Amendment is not incapable of a broader reading, and that the language
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O'Connor articulates that "the just compensation requirement spreads
the cost of condemnations... [while t]he public use requirement... im-
poses a more basic limitation, circumscribing the very scope of the emi-
nent domain power.''97
After quoting the famous language from Calder v. Bull, 198 Justice
O'Connor, author of the Court's opinion in Midkiff, begins the dissent in
Kelo with a disquieting pronouncement of the demise of the Public Use
Clause and consequent imminent danger to the private property of those
who do not possess political power.'99 Justice O'Connor points out that
the majority opinion, having effectively eliminated the public use re-
quirement, creates a situation in which those with political influence and
power can forcibly deprive others of their private property through the
unfair use of the political process.200 Her dissent notes that the majority
opinion enables outcomes that are precisely those which the Framers,
disenchanted with misuse of raw unchecked power in the colonial legisla-
tures by those with political influence, sought to curtail.20' Justice
O'Connor states that the limitations on the exercise of eminent domain,
namely, the public use and just compensation requirements "serve to
protect 'the security of Property,' which Alexander Hamilton described
to the Philadelphia Convention as one of the 'great obj[ects] of
Gov[ernment]. ' ' 2° Justice O'Connor further states, "[t]ogether they en-
sure stable property ownership by providing safeguards against excessive,
unpredictable, or unfair use of the government's eminent domain
power-particularly against those owners who, for whatever reasons, may
be unable to protect themselves in the political process against the major-
ultimately adopted as the Fifth Amendment does not seem as strong as the language that
Madison originally proposed. Stoebuck, supra note 7, at 591, 595.
197. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2672 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
198. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) ("An Act of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a
law) contrary to the great first principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a
rightful exercise of legislative authority.... A few instances will suffice to explain what I
mean.... [A] law that takes property from A. and gives it to B: It is against all reason and
justice, for a people to entrust a Legislature with such powers; and, therefore, it cannot be
presumed that they have done it." (emphasis omitted)).
199. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2671 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[A]I private property is now
vulnerable to being taken and transferred to another private owner, so long as it might be
upgraded-i.e., given to an owner who will use it in a way that the legislature deems more
beneficial to the public-in the process. To reason, as the Court does, that the incidental
public benefits resulting from the subsequent ordinary use of private property render eco-
nomic development takings 'for public use' is to wash out any distinction between private
and public use of property-and thereby effectively to delete the words 'for public use'
from the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.").
200. Id. at 2671, 2677.
201. Id. at 2677.
202. Id. at 2672 (alterations in original) (quoting 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 302 (Max Farrand ed., 1934).
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ity's will."2 3 Justice O'Connor2°4 concludes the dissent in which Chief
Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia and Thomas joined, stating that
"the government now has license to transfer property from those with
fewer resources to those with more. The Founders cannot have intended
this perverse result."20 5
In his separate dissent in Kelo, Justice Thomas focuses on the original
meaning of the Public Use Clause.2 6 He points out that the majority
opinion "has erased the Public Use Clause from our Constitution... [by]
construing the Public Use Clause to be a virtual nullity, without the
slightest nod to its original meaning." 2°7 Justice Thomas notes: "If the
Public Use Clause served no function other than to state that the gov-
ernment may take property through its eminent domain power-for pub-
lic or private uses-then it would be surplusage."2'  The only other alter-
203. Id.
204. In her dissent, Justice O'Connor distinguishes Berman v. Parker and Midkiff, and
clarifies her earlier statement, as author of the majority opinion in Midkiff about public
use being equated with the police power. Id. at 2674-75.
205. Id. at 2677. I contend that "those with fewer resources" means racial and ethnic
minorities, the old, the disabled and the poor. See id. This says something very negative
about our national commitment to diversity and equality of opportunity. However, in
Kelo, the phrase "those with fewer resources" also happens to refer to individuals within
the middle class, given their weaker political influence as compared to the financial power,
access to those in positions of governmental power, and means of political influence held
by various industries and giant corporations. Id. Perhaps this explains, in part, the social
outcry over Kelo. The middle class is now being treated with the same callous disregard as
had previously been reserved for the poor, the elderly, and minorities. See supra note 28
and accompanying text.
Earlier in the same paragraph, Justice O'Connor had described who she meant when
referring to those with more resources, namely, "those citizens with disproportionate in-
fluence and power in the political process, including large corporations and development
firms." Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2677 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Professor Levy also referred to
corporations in his article. See Levy, supra note 179, at 175. Interestingly, Robert F. Ken-
nedy, Jr. joins Justice O'Connor in decrying the disproportional political power of large
corporations; he argues that politically influential corporations have used their power to
weaken both enforcement of existing environmental regulations and the actual language of
environmental regulations to enhance corporate profits at the expense of the health of
ordinary citizens both today and in future generations. See generally Robert F. Kennedy,
Jr., Crimes Against Nature, 18 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 693 (2006).
206. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2677-78 (Thomas, J., dissenting). In addition, Justice Thomas
also argues that the majority opinion in Kelo is but the most recent in a string of misguided
cases that progressively deviated from the Public Use Clause's original meaning. Id. at
2678. Justice Thomas asserts that two lines of errant precedent converged in Berman and
Midkiff. Id. at 2685.
207. Id. at 2678.
208. Id. Justice Thomas also quoted from the Court's opinion in Marbury v. Madison,
where the Court stated: "'It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is in-
tended to be without effect."' Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174
(1803)). Justice Thomas thus discredits the interpretation that is the result of the major-
ity's opinion.
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native, he explains, is that the Public Use Clause "could distinguish those
takings that require compensation from those that do not.... This [inter-
pretation] would contradict a bedrock principle well established by the
time of the founding: that all takings required the payment of compensa-
tion."2 9 Ultimately, Justice Thomas concludes that he "would revisit [the
Court's] Public Use Clause cases and consider returning to the original
meaning of the Public Use Clause: that the government may take prop-
erty only if it actually uses or gives the public a legal right to use the prop-
erty., 210 He asserts that "it is 'imperative that the Court maintain abso-
lute fidelity to' the Clause's express limit on the power of the government
over the individual, no less than with every other liberty expressly enu-
merated in the Fifth Amendment or the Bill of Rights more generally. ,
21
The objections of these and other scholars and jurists apply with even
more force to temporary physical takings that create leaseholds through
the use of condemnation proceedings. Professor Levy's analysis would
require a strict scrutiny standard of review 12 for takings against natural
persons. 3 One could conclude from Professor Treanor's writings that he
would seek to preserve an understanding of the Takings Clause that it
constitutes very deliberate language intended to protect individuals' pri-
vate property from abusive legislative action through carefully chosen,
214
strict limitations that require both public use and just compensation.
Extending the analyses of Justices Thomas and O'Connor to the estab-
lishment of a leasehold through condemnation proceedings, both would
209. Id. at 2678-79.
210. Id. at 2686. Justice Thomas closes his dissent by concluding that the "public pur-
pose" interpretation is "deeply perverse," favoring those with disproportionate political
influence and power, and victimizing the weak, particularly the poor, the elderly, and non-
white and minority communities. Id. at 2687.
211. Id. at 2678 (quoting Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 28 (2005) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
212. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. Again, it should be noted that the
three justices dissenting from the decision of the Supreme Court of Connecticut "would
have imposed a 'heightened' standard of judicial review for takings" constituting economic
development. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2661.
213. I can appreciate Professor Levy's distinction between natural persons and artifi-
cial entities. See supra note 183. Also, like Justice O'Connor and Robert F. Kennedy, Jr.,
I lament the political power and influence of large corporate entities that is wielded at the
expense of ordinary persons. See supra note 205. However, I also note that not all corpo-
rations are behemoths with extraordinary political influence. Many individuals choose to
hold title to their land in a trust, a limited liability company, or another artificial entity for
tax, probate, or liability purposes. Professor Levy's formulation, which would exclude
protection for artificial entities, misses the mark and would fail to protect many of the
individuals whom Professor Levy would likely seek to protect. Thus, further refinement of
Professor Levy's formulation is needed.
214. See supra notes 187-93 and accompanying text.
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eliminate economic development takings that create leaseholds. Fur-
ther, they would interpret the Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment
to allow government to engage in takings that create a leasehold when
government itself will actually use the leased property or when the public
216
will have the right to use the leased property. Based on the reasoning
in her dissent, I believe that Justice O'Connor would also allow condem-
nation proceedings if the leasehold interest is to be transferred to one or
more private parties, such as common carriers regulated by govern-
ment.2 " The private parties, however, would be required to make the
property available to the public for its use on a basis regulated by the
government-for example, a railroad company, an electric utility com-
pany, or a stadium that provides access to all members of the public upon
payment of a fee regulated or monitored by the government.218
While the majority opinion in Kelo may well be the logical descendent
of Berman v. Parker29 and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,20 and
therefore, according to some commentators, breaks very little new
215. The use of leaseholds, rather than fee simple ownership, for economic develop-
ment projects is not as far-fetched as it may seem initially. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2660 n.4
(noting that while the litigation was pending, the New London Development Corporation
was negotiating a ninety-nine-year lease with a developer. Professor Mihaly also notes
that the government condemnor of a fee simple interest often enters into a long-term
ground lease with a private developer in redevelopment projects. See Mihaly, supra note
171, at 51. Accordingly, government could easily skip the step in which it takes fee simple
title; economic development projects could be effectuated by takings that created long
term ground leaseholds in the governmental entity, such as ninety-nine-year leases, leaving
the reversion in fee simple in the individual condenmee/property owner. The government
could then assign or sublease its interest in the leasehold to the new private party, thus
vesting the long-term possessory interest in a private party that enjoys greater political
favor, and achieving a result much like that decried by the dissenting Justices in Kelo. See
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2677 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2686-87 (Thomas, J., dis-
senting).
216. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2686 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2673
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 2673 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
218. Id. She would also allow such a taking if the leasehold interest to be transferred to
one or more private parties would resolve problems in which the existing use of the prop-
erty was harmful to the public and such harm would be eliminated by the use of the lease-
hold by the private party following the taking. Id. at 2674. This latter situation is the
means by which Justice O'Connor distinguished her opinion in Midkiff from the situation
in Kelo. Id. at 2674-75. I do not mention it in the main text of this Article because this
particular aspect of Justice O'Connor's reasoning in Kelo seems more appropriate to tak-
ings of a fee simple that would yield a permanent solution to the extant harm.
219. 348 U.S. 26 (1954); see also Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2663.
220. 467 U.S. 229 (1984). Kelo could also be seen as the logical descendent of Pole-
town Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, had it not been overturned by the Supreme
Court of Michigan on the basis of the requirements of the Constitution of the State of
Michigan. See County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 787 (Mich. 2004).
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ground,22' it fails to take into account the significance of the ownership of
real property in the United States.l 2 Rather, it treats real property,
owned and cherished by individuals as indicia of their freedom, as being
the fungible equivalent of money. z It is but an extension of a disturbing
trend in which corporate power and political influence seeks to trump the
rights of individual citizens.224
2. Application to Takings that Create Leaseholds
Having thus extended, at least theoretically, these scholars' and jurists'
objections to temporary takings that create leaseholds via condemnation
proceedings, it is clear that they implicate specific objections that are
raised against such leaseholds. These objections involve, ultimately, the
appropriate standard of constitutional review, the proper interpretation
of the Public Use Clause, the proper application of checks and balances
to government power, finding the means to control unfair use of the po-
litical process, and the value we place on individual autonomy.
Regardless of whether one agrees with my criticism of the majority
opinion in Kelo, the significance of property ownership and its fundamen-
221. See Gillette, supra note 163, at 13; Mihaly, supra note 171, at 42. Regardless of the
various viewpoints on the Kelo decision, that case serves to highlight the need for immedi-
ate change in the narrow realm of the use of eminent domain to create leaseholds.
222. Professor Mihaly admits that "Americans of most political persuasions found the
majority decision [in Kelo] wrong-headed and oppressive." Mihaly, supra note 171, at 41.
He characterizes, however, the "fear that government will act as an agent of private rather
than public power" as a political position derived through assiduous (and perhaps insidi-
ous) effort by those on the organized political right. Id. at 41, 56. Professor Mihaly main-
tains that the outcome in Kelo was correct. However, he also asserts that both the majority
and the dissenters, as well as the general public, have little understanding of or apprecia-
tion for modern land-use redevelopment efforts in urban settings. Id. at 42-43. While the
public may lack comprehensive understanding of current land-use redevelopment prac-
tices, this does not mean that their fear that government officials can succumb to the politi-
cal influence of the powerful is misplaced. Many examples exist; for instance, many indi-
viduals would attribute homeowner's insurance woes, health insurance coverage, and pre-
scription coverage difficulties to the power and political influence of the insurance indus-
try. Both Professor Mihaly and I note that the merits of current land-use practices in ur-
ban redevelopment practices are beyond the scope of our respective articles. Id. at 56.
223. A fundamental policy-level question arises: is it not important that social reform
through land use planning not be achieved in a way that facilitates misuse of political influ-
ence?
224. See Kennedy, supra note 205; cf Jaime Davids, Note, Eldred v. Ashcroft: A Criti-
cal Analysis of the Supreme Court Decision, 13 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 173, 175
(2003); Richard A. Epstein, Congress's Copyright Giveaway, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 1998, at
A19; Laurie J. Richter, Reproductive Freedom: Striking a Fair Balance Between Copyright
and Other Intellectual Property Protections in Cartoon Characters (Spring 2006) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with Catholic University Law Review); Chris Sprigman, The
Mouse that Ate the Public Domain: Disney, The Copyright Extension Act, and Eldred v.
Ashcroft, FINDLAW, Mar. 5, 2002, http://www.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20020305
.sprigman.htmil.
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tal role in Americans' sense of personal dignity and freedom is high-
lighted when one considers that establishment of a leasehold through
condemnation forces the condemnee into a continuing business relation-
ship against his or her will. Condemnation of a fee simple is by definition
an involuntary transfer. It may be upsetting and disagreeable during the
proceedings; the measurement of just compensation may leave the con-
demnee with less or more than he or she believes is full compensation;
however, it has an end. The establishment of a leasehold in the con-
demnee's property, by contrast, is an ongoing involuntary business rela-
tionship for the duration of the leasehold. It is therefore a continuing
government intrusion and irritant, and would seem to many people to be
a direct affront to one's sense of liberty. From an emotional, if not tech-
nically a constitutional, standpoint, it resonates of concerns for freedom
of contract and freedom of association.2' The continuing affront has an
oppressive nature to it that is likely to erode the condemnee's sense of
personal dignity.
The impact of government's establishment of a leasehold through emi-
nent domain seems particularly intrusive when the taking is of a part of a
multi-tenant facility such as the office building or shopping center men-
tioned in the two examples at the beginning of this Article.226 Although
partial temporary takings are common when government takes a part of a
landowner's land for a temporary easement during construction of road
improvements, an actual physical taking and operation of a part of the
landowner's business premises in a shopping center or in an office build-
ing seems more surprising. Opponents to creation of government lease-
holds would point out that this government action directly interferes with
the condemnee's business objectives and relationships on an ongoing
basis. For example, government's usage may make it impossible for the
shopping center to have a tenant mix that the landlord desires or has
promised to other tenants. If the government users do not frequent the
other businesses in a retail shopping center, the use of parking by gov-
ernmental invitees excludes shoppers and diminishes the gross revenue of
the shopping center. As a consequence, the non-governmental tenants'
gross revenue is reduced, and the landlord's percentage rent is dimin-
ished.tm This, in turn, adversely impacts the ultimate value of the shop-
ping center on the real estate market.228
225. The real concern is more accurately one of individual autonomy, yet the emo-
tional reaction is so strong that the American mind turns to its Constitution for relief.
226. Such takings amount to a partial temporary physical taking.
227. Are these non-compensable consequential losses to property owners whose prop-
erty is not taken? See Campbell v. United States, 266 U.S. 368, 371-72 (1924).
228. In a permanent partial taking, just compensation includes the market value of the
property taken plus the diminution of value to the remainder caused by the taking. 4
SACKMAN, supra note 3, § 12.01; Alan T. Ackerman & Noah Eliezer Yanich, Just Corn-
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Now consider the impact of the Court's interpretation of the Public
Use Clause in Kelo. 29 Under this interpretation of public use, govern-
ment could engage in a Kelo-like taking that establishes a leasehold in a
large portion of a multi-tenant commercial property, such as the most
desirable space in a shopping center. Having taken the leasehold from
private citizen A, whether A is the fee owner or another tenant, govern-
ment could transfer the term for years to another private party, B, that
has greater political power and influence than A. While forcing a land-
owner to do business with government through creation of a leasehold
that is used and occupied by government may seem intrusive, it is un-
questionable that the government has a right to take property for its own
use by eminent domain. By contrast, the Kelo-like transfer seems espe-
cially violative of the citizen's rights both to personal autonomy and to do
business or refrain from doing business with anyone he pleases, provided
that the refusal is not in violation of law. In Kelo, as unfortunate as the
impact on the citizens may have been, the taking had an end when the
property owners lost their land.20 In the example provided here, the
condemnee is forced into an involuntary ongoing relationship with a pri-
vate party with whom it would not otherwise contract. 23' Moreover, when
the taking is of only a part of an integrated project, the ongoing business
relationship can be quite complicated and therefore confrontational on a
continuing basis. In this type of project, it is likely that the landlord will
be responsible for providing a number of services such as water, HVAC,
pensation and the Framers' Intent: A Constitutional Approach to Road Construction Dam-
ages in Partial Taking Cases, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 241, 241-42 (2000). One can
quickly see that a myriad of considerations arise, such as loss of percentage rent and
breach of covenants in leases with other tenants. This can be ameliorated to a significant
extent through modifications to just compensation. However, it is also necessary to con-
sider whether property owners and their tenants might attempt to manipulate the calcula-
tion of just compensation through their choice of language in the lease. Since the people
primarily impacted by such manipulation would be the taxpayers, this is further reason for
a narrowing of the circumstances in which creation of a leasehold through condemnation
proceedings should be allowed. Such narrowing is discussed below in this section.
229. See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2664-66 (2005).
230. Id. at 2668.
231. It is not unheard of that the law can force someone into a business relationship
against his will. Consider, for example, the provisions of the Fair Housing Act and Civil
Rights Act. Note that here, however, the involuntary business relationship that is forced
upon the unwilling condemnee lacks the public policy bases that is fundamental to legisla-
tive enactments, such as the Fair Housing Act and Civil Rights Act, designed to eliminate
the visages of racial and other types of invidious discrimination or other social evils. See,
e.g., Katherine G. Stearns, Comment, Countering Implicit Discrimination in Real Estate
Advertisements: A Call for the Issuance of Human Model Injunctions, 88 Nw. U. L. REV.
1200, 1205-08 (1994). Here, it may simply be a matter of the wealthy and politically power-
ful and influential using the machinery of government to take from a citizen having lesser
political influence property with which the citizen would not part on a voluntary basis in
ordinary negotiations.
Catholic University Law Review
elevator service, parking, common area maintenance, and security. The
greater the need for interaction with the lessee, the more intrusive the
• • 232
continuing involuntary association.
It is easy to imagine all kinds of Kelo-like condemnations involving
transfers of leasehold to a private party of the government's choosing
that would appear to be an affront to liberty and a misuse of government
power: (1) the creation of a government leasehold in a research facility
owned by private party A, followed by an assignment of the leasehold to
private party B, a powerful business with questionable business ethics
that had previously engaged in industrial espionage against party A; or
(2) the creation of a leasehold in a building owned and occupied by party
A, a church that opposes abortion, followed by a transfer of the leasehold
to private party B for use as an abortion clinic by B, a politically powerful
private entity.33
3. A Solution
The examples above highlight the crux of the problem. The con-
demnees in these examples would be doing nothing illegal or even re-
motely wrong if they refused to lease to these parties outside the involun-
tary situation forced on them by the Kelo-like condemnation of a lease-
hold. These outcomes violate the cultural convention, described by Pro-
fessor Treanor, that "[a] democratic government should not treat its citi-
zens in a way that is generally thought to be unfair.•2M Professor Treanor
232. The intrusion is not limited to only the lessor. Other tenants in the project will be
impacted as well. Moreover, the use by B may cause the breach of other tenants' leases
with their landlord, such as covenants regarding tenant mix and parking. Again, I point
out that the legally permissible underlying motivation for the taking in a Kelo-type transac-
tion can be nothing more than economic gain (supposedly economic gain or benefit to the
community in general), based on "studies" commissioned by an unduly influenced gov-
ernment, but coincidentally having sizable "incidental" economic gain to politically power-
ful B. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2675 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). This involuntary relationship
has nothing to do with eliminating discrimination or protecting other fundamental rights.
233. Here, the public use requirement, as interpreted in Kelo, would be met if the
governmental entity determined that family planning services, including abortion, would
be helpful in reducing the number of poor people being born in that particular economi-
cally distressed area of the city. While such a stated purpose might technically meet the
rational basis test that presently prevails based on Kelo, the public use is more likely to be
stated less controversially, such as making family planning services available in that area of
the city (without mentioning the desire to reduce the birth rate among poor people). See
id. at 2665-66 (majority opinion). I bring this up to note that the underlying, but often
unstated, public purpose of urban renewal projects may be to force out the poor so that the
community becomes more "desirable" to those who are economically well-off and politi-
cally powerful.
234. Treanor, supra note 149, at 1156. I admit to discomfort if one were to argue for
uncritical acceptance of cultural conventions to shape the law. Uncritical adherence to
cultural conventions could result in majority oppression of minorities. For example, one
could argue that segregation was once a cultural convention in the United States.
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further asserts that violation of cultural conventions is a prime motivator
of the property rights movement.2 35 Professor Stoebuck contends: "A
private person has the inherent privilege of doing anything he has the
natural capacity for, limited by regulations imposed for the protection of
others." - By trampling this inherent privilege, the Kelo-like taking to
create a leasehold in a private party violates the cultural convention de-
scribed by Professor Treanor and damages the social contract between
the people and a democratic government.237
The magnitude and severity of the problems presented by condemna-
tions to create leaseholds are so serious as to demand a solution beyond
adjustments to just compensation.38 Limitations are needed as a matter
of public policy. A total prohibition on takings that create a leasehold
does not make sense. As described in Part III, particularly in United
States v. General Motors Corp. and more recent cases, a term of years is
clearly an interest in property that can be the subject of a taking.2 9 Thus,
it should be capable of being created through condemnation proceedings
in appropriate circumstances. To conclude otherwise would create
anomalous legal results-the law would recognize temporary regulatory
takings but not temporary takings through condemnation proceedings.
There could be takings of temporary easements as is commonly done for
road construction projects, but there could not be a temporary taking in
the nature of a leasehold. Such results would simply defy logic and would
not be in keeping with constitutional principles or the large body of law
governing eminent domain.2 °
Nevertheless, certain aspects of the leaseholds created through con-
demnation are very troubling. The most troubling aspect of this form of
holding, and the one that distinguishes it from most other types of tak-
ings, is the coerced continuing relationship between the govern-
ment/holder of the leasehold and the condemnee that is forced upon the
condemnee for the duration of the taking. In most takings, the dealings
between the condemnor and the condemnee end when the fee simple is
vested in the condemnor and just compensation is paid to the con-
235. See id. at 1155-56.
236. Stoebuck, supra note 7, at 588.
237. See Treanor, supra note 149, at 1152-54.
238. See, e.g., Gillette, supra note 163, at 20-21 (recommending adjustments to just
compensation for Kelo-type takings of fee simple interests).
239. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 341-42 (2002); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of
Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 319 (1987); Skip Kirchdorfer, Inc. v. United States, 6 F.3d 1573,
1582 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Hendler v. United States (Hendler 111), 952 F.2d 1364, 1376 (Fed.
Cir. 1991); Pettro v. United States, 47 Fed. Cl. 136, 138 (2000).
240. Moreover, it could leave government without an important and legitimate means
of responding to an immediate need in times of emergency.
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demnee.2A' There is no coerced ongoing relationship. Even in a perma-
nent partial taking, there is no ongoing relationship between condemnor
and condemnee. In a partial taking, just compensation is measured dif-
ferently than in a total permanent taking to compensate the condemnee
for damage to his remaining property that is occasioned by the partial
taking.242 The only commonly occurring taking in which there is some
ongoing relationship between condemnee and condemnor is the taking of
an easement. However, in the vast majority of those instances, the ease-
ment will vest in government itself, an agent of government such as the
general contractor performing road work for government, or in a private
entity in the nature of a common carrier such as a utility company that
provides public services to the general public and is regulated or moni-
tored by government.24 What distinguishes the taking of a leasehold
from a taking of an easement is that in most instances, the condemnee is
not required to provide continuing services to the easement holder; the
condemnee is merely required to refrain from interfering with the ease-
ment.2' When a leasehold is taken in condemnee's property, the level of
services and the extent of continuing interaction between condenmee and
the holder of the leasehold could be extensive, depending on the type of
premises that are taken.245 If the premises taken are part of an integrated
facility such as an office building or shopping center, the condemnee
might be obligated to provide an array of services that are only typical in
a consensual relationship.2 " Each of these services would be required to
be provided at a qualitative level that could be the source of dispute.
Moreover, the condemnee may have to enforce compliance of the holder
of the leasehold with the rules and regulations governing the tenants of
241. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
242. See 4 SACKMAN, supra note 3, § 12.01; Ackerman & Yanich, supra note 228, at
241-42.
243. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421
(1982).
244. The condemnee may be required to allow occasional entry on the servient estate
for maintenance of the easement. This is similar to the temporary partial taking in Hendler
III, in which the government entered to do monitoring and maintain the wells, but the
condemnee did not have significant ongoing interaction with the government, nor was the
condemnee required to provide services to the government. See Hendler II, 952 F.2d at
1377.
245. If the leasehold consists of all of the condemnee's premises (for example, a lot
with a free-standing building in the nature of a triple-net lease), the condemnee might have
to provide few services.
246. The condemnee might well be required to provide HVAC; hot and cold running
water; roof and other structural repairs; traffic control in the parking lot; grounds mainte-
nance; common area decor, maintenance, cleaning, and repair; plumbing and electrical
repairs; elevator service; security services, and other services. See note 232 and accompa-
nying text.
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the office building or shopping center.247 This is very different than the
typical burden of an easement upon the servient property.
What limitations are appropriate? For example, one could adapt Pro-
fessor Levy's proposal to require strict scrutiny review when a leasehold
is created in the property of a natural person.2 48 This strict scrutiny test
could be expressed in a variety of ways.249 Professor Levy focuses on the
constitutional rights of individuals, and therefore would not require strict
scrutiny if the condemnee is not a natural person.250 Therefore, his test
would not seem to apply to a dwelling titled in a trust by an elderly per-
son, or to "mom" and "pop," if they hold their land and small neighbor-
hood grocery business in the name of an entity. Due to the frequency
with which individuals title their real property in artificial entities, even
if the land is essentially for their personal use, I assert that tests differen-
tiating between property that is titled in natural persons or artificial enti-
ties are not the best means of setting appropriate limitations on such tak-
ings. 2  Likewise, I believe that tests calling for differing levels of scrutiny
based on whether the taking is for government use or transfer to a private
247. What is the penalty when the holder of the leasehold, whether government or a
private party in a Kelo-like transaction, refuses to abide by the rules and regulations of the
building? The condemnee landlord may not have available the remedy of termination of
the lessee's leasehold as is the case in typical leases. Likely, the condemnee landlord will
be subjected to the cost and inconvenience of taking legal action to seek injunctive relief as
to continuing or repetitive noncompliance and damages for past harm.
248. See Levy, supra note 179, at 183-84. Professor Levy addresses his test to regula-
tions curtailing individuals' rights in property in the exercise of police power under both
the Commerce and Takings Clauses. He enunciates his test as follows: whether the regula-
tion "is in fact a significant means of achieving a legitimate police power objective, and
whether it achieves that objective without unnecessarily burdening private rights." Id. at
184; see also supra notes 182-86 and accompanying text.
249. One possibility is to determine whether the public is the only, or merely the pri-
mary, beneficiary of the benefit. On the basis of Kelo, a private party should not be the
primary beneficiary. See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2661 (2005). In
addition, under this test, the court would need to determine whether the benefit to be
derived is significant to the public welfare, whether the public benefits are likely to accrue,
and whether the taking achieves those public benefits without unnecessarily burdening
private rights. Under such a test, the court could find that the taking to create a leasehold
is or is not permissible. Or, the court could find, on a proper prayer for relief, that the
government is required to take a fee simple if it goes forward with the taking. See infra
text accompanying notes 275-77. The strict scrutiny test enunciated here is only one possi-
bility. Because I favor a different means of imposing limitations on the creation of lease-
holds through condemnation proceedings, I have not focused extensively on this test.
250. See Levy, supra note 179, at 183-84; see also supra note 183.
251. Individuals may choose to hold their property in an artificial entity for a number
of reasons, such as estate planning or limitation of liability.
252. In addition to the reasons described below, the Fifth Amendment refers to "pri-
vate property" and does not distinguish between property owned by a natural person ver-
sus an artificial entity. U.S. CONST. amend. V. However, Professor Levy also explains that
in the era of the Framers, property tended to be owned by individuals. See Levy, supra
note 179, at 175.
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party for a private use-with some public benefit so that the (low) stan-
dards enunciated in Kelo would be fulfilled-are not the best means of
setting appropriate limitations. In the first instance, the test would be
changed if the entity holding title were to convey title to an individual.
Obviously, such action would have a variety of tax and other implica-
tions. It does not make sense to condition the standards applicable to a
taking under the Takings Clause of the Constitution on whether or not
the owner of property is willing to be subjected to various income tax,
estate planning, ad valorem tax, and general liability consequences.
Likewise, a test calling for differing levels of scrutiny based on whether
the taking is for government use or for transfer to a private party is un-
workable. A governmental entity that could be pressured into engaging
in a taking creating a leasehold based on undue political influence and
favoritism likely would not find it overly burdensome to take the lease-
hold, purportedly for government use, and then transfer it to the private
party after the passage of a certain amount of time.
Another alternative is to require strict or heightened scrutiny whenever
real property is to be condemned for creation of a leasehold regardless of
whether government or a private party is to be the lessee. 53 In the inter-
est of efficient judicial administration, "public use" appears to be a better
touchstone for this limited type of taking, instead of developing a specific
type of heightened scrutiny test.
Another possible limitation is to allow takings that create leaseholds
only if exigent circumstances exist. Courts would have to determine what
constitutes exigent circumstances, but I believe that this could be accom-
plished.2') Nevertheless, I would use the idea of exigency, or more prop-
erly stated, special circumstances, in a different way to address the situa-
tion.
It is my position that where the holder of the leasehold created by con-
demnation is neither the government itself nor an entity that directly pro-
vides public services, the continuing forced relationship between the con-
demnee and the lessee becomes completely untenable. This is the taking
of a leasehold that I describe as being "Kelo-like": a transfer to a private
party, possibly a political favorite, for private use that will supposedly
provide some benefit to the public based on speculative legislative find-
253. While reexamination of the appropriate level of scrutiny may be fertile ground for
further examination, it may be more productive if any such inquiry did not focus on one
small aspect of eminent domain. At this point in time, and in order to put controls in place
before creation of leaseholds through condemnation proceedings become widespread, I
prefer the approach described below that would not allow leaseholds created through
condemnation proceedings to be used by private parties unless the private party was pro-
viding public services from the location.
254. Even though I encourage further study on the possible limitation of exigent cir-
cumstances, at present, I find the approach that is described in the remainder of this Arti-
cle to be more workable.
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ings. I suggest that the coerced continuing relationship that exists in the
leasehold situation distinguishes it from the facts in the majority's deci-
sion in Kelo and necessitates limitations on such transfers; they ought not
occur in condemnation proceedings to create a leasehold.2 "5
The continuing involuntary relationship between condemnee and the
holder of the leasehold that is created because of the condemnation is a
sufficiently special circumstance to warrant special limitations on the ba-
sis of public policy. The limitation that I recommend is a narrowing of
the public uses for which a leasehold could be created in private property.
Thus, not all of the public uses as interpreted under the broad Kelo pub-
lic purpose test would be sufficient to create a leasehold. Because of the
special circumstances of the involuntary continuing relationship involved
in the leasehold situation, only those uses that are truly public-namely,
those in which the government itself, the public in general, 2 6 or an entity
that will be providing services from the leasehold premises as an agent of
government-would be sufficient to allow the creation of a leasehold
through condemnation proceedings. I am well aware that the complexity
of the involuntary relationship could vary greatly. There could be situa-
tions in which the condemnor takes all of the condemnee's premises for
the duration of the leasehold and few, if any, services would be required.
On the other hand, in the case of a partial taking of an integrated project,
such as space within an office building or shopping center, as described in
the two examples in the introduction to this Article, the ongoing relation-
ship, the services to be required, and the burdens upon the condemnee
could be quite complex. Rather than placing courts in a position of sec-
ond-guessing, possibly prospectively, what services might be needed and
what extent of services would constitute an impermissible invasion of the
condemnee's rights when a private party is to be the holder of the lease-
hold, I recommend, in the interest of predictability, that the public use
simply be narrowed as I have described above for takings that create a
leasehold. Such a limitation would not be difficult to administer. 7 This
255. Regardless of one's constitutional viewpoint, the obvious problem involved in a
Kelo-like condemnation to create a leasehold is the same.
256. Instances in which the public in general would use the leasehold would be very
rare. I can think only of a park or a free public library as fitting the definition when ap-
plied to leaseholds. However, based on limitations on long-term leaseholds and ground
leases that are recommended elsewhere in this Article, these circumstances would be rare.
See supra Part IV.
257. See supra notes 194-24 and accompanying text. It should be noted that my pro-
posed limitations to the Public Use Clause are not exactly like those stated by either Jus-
tice O'Connor or Justice Thomas. My approach does not include takings for transfer to
private parties to address situations in which the prior use was harmful to the public, such
as that described by Justice O'Connor. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2674-75 (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting). In that instance, the government should take the fee, not a leasehold. Justice
Thomas would limit the meaning of public use to situations in which the government actu-
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solution would relieve the court from second-guessing the wisdom of the
legislature's findings of public purpose and public benefit, a concern that
is expressed in Public Use Clause opinions.2 s It would also relieve con-
demnees from involuntary continuing relationships with private entities
engaged in private use. 9 The only coerced continuing relationship would
then be one between the condemnee and government or an entity acting
as an agent of government for the purpose of providing public services. I
would argue that when government, or an entity providing servies in the
nature of government services, is the occupant of the leasehold, the con-
demnee has consented to such interference with the condemnee's private
rights as part of the price of government.26 Moreover, a continuing in-
voluntary relationship with government already exists in eminent do-
main; it is a situation that frequently occurs when government takes a
temporary easement in a condemnee's property.26' Moreover, such a re-
lationship with government was present in the General Motors line of
ally uses the property or the public is given the "legal right to use the property." Id. at
2682 (Thomas, J., dissenting). I add private entities that provide public services, because
the services being provided are those that the government itself could provide. The pri-
vate provider is acting as an agent of government. Essentially, I would treat the private
actor providing the government services as government, based on generalized agency
principles.
258. See, e.g., Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984). Interestingly, the
solution I suggest yields a result that is similar, although not identical, to the results that
could be obtained from a heightened scrutiny test, but with much greater ease of judicial
administration and predictability for government and property owners.
259. Based on agency principles, I would consider a private entity providing govern-
ment services to be the equivalent of government for this purpose.
260. See Stoebuck, supra note 7, at 568. Stating the situation even more pragmatically,
a leasehold seems less intrusive if government or an entity providing governmental services
is the lessee because everyone expects to have a continuing relationship with government
under a variety of governmental powers-taxation, traffic control, zoning, and the like-
whether one approves or not.
261. I point out that under the Court's decision in Kelo, it would be permissible for
government to create an easement for a private party for its private use across the land of,
and against the will of, the condemnee, based on some legislative finding of attenuated
public benefit. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2663. For example, an easement for vehicular access
across the yard of a private homeowner could be condemned and transferred to Costco to
relocate Costco's driveway, thus reducing traffic congestion at an intersection where
Costco's present entrance is located on its own land. I do not believe that enabling private
entities to purchase property that is ill-suited to its private purposes and then correcting
the situation through the exercise of eminent domain is what the Framers or the cultural
consensus had in mind.
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26226cases, which are still regarded with favor by the Court. In these in-
stances, the modifications to the calculation of just compensation that are
described above are sufficient.
The states are free to eliminate Kelo-like takings to create leaseholds
under the reservation of rights that was reaffirmed in Kelo.264 The federal
courts could establish this limitation on public policy grounds; to do oth-
erwise would force these condemnees to bear a greatly disproportional
burden-that of continuing intrusion-in violation of the principle enun-
ciated in Armstrong v. United States. 265 Interestingly, other commentators
have already laid the groundwork for such a result through their work on
other aspects of eminent domain. Professor Treanor asserts that cultural
conventions and their influence on what constitutes undue burden under
the Armstrong principle have a place in shaping the law of eminent do-
main.26 In his 1972 work, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, Profes-
sor Stoebuck asks as rhetorical question: "What further evil lies in the
specific taking that compensation will not cure? ' ,267 The Kelo-like taking
to create a leasehold is such an evil and must be eliminated on public
policy grounds.
Having addressed the Kelo-like taking to create a leasehold, a few addi-
tional details still need to be resolved. What if a government itself uses
the leasehold, and then, after the passage of time, assigns or subleases its
interest in the leasehold to a private party for private purposes? I would
recommend that such action would automatically terminate the leasehold
without a reduction in just compensation. This would prevent a govern-
mental entity from being coerced into creating a Kelo-like leasehold by
subterfuge.
The next issue is what happens if government's use of the leasehold
that is created in part of condemnee's property is not reasonably com-
262. See Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 3 (1949); United States v.
Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 374 (1946); United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S.
373, 375 (1945). It should be noted that these leaseholds involved the entirety of the con-
demnee's premises for the duration of the taking. A partial temporary taking was involved
in Hendler III. See Hendler v. United States (Hendler II1), 952 F.2d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir.
1991). Under the particular facts in Hendler III, just compensation was ultimately denied
because the property owner suffered no compensable damage. Hendler v. United States
(Hendler IV), 175 F.3d 1374, 1383, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
263. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 318 (1987).
264. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2668.
265. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); see also Treanor, supra
note 149, at 1153-54.
266. See Treanor, supra note 149, at 1154-56 (arguing for a differential measurement of
just compensation in certain instances guided by cultural consensus). But see supra note
234 (expressing my reservations concerning uncritical adoption of cultural conventions as
legal standards).
267. Stoebuck, supra note 7, at 596.
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patible with the use of the remainder of the property by the condemnee
or the condemnee's tenants? This is a problem that is common in emi-
nent domain. I suggest, however, that like problems described earlier in
268this Article, this can be addressed to a significant extent in the meas-
urement of compensation for a temporary partial taking. 9
It is also necessary to consider whether the extent of changes to the
leasehold premises to modify it for the use of government or govern-
ment's agent is a factor requiring some special limitations due to the
unique nature of a taking that creates a leasehold. Which party is respon-
sible for making the modifications to the premises, and for the cost
thereof? Who is responsible for returning the premises to their original
condition? In most instances, I again suggest that this can be handled to
some extent through just compensation.27°
Perhaps there will be situations in which the modifications are so ex-
tensive that the premises cannot be returned to their original condition.
This problem should be addressed in the same manner as a condemna-
tion of a leasehold that calls for the destruction and rebuilding of the im-
provements on the premises because it is similar to the taking of a lease-
hold in the nature of a long-term ground lease, or a taking that is of such
a long duration that it is objectively a taking of the fee because the
"chips" 271 of ownership left in the condemnee are such that justice would
be better served if government were required to take the fee simple.
Perhaps in these situations consideration should be given to a process in
which the court would allow the condemnee to make a request that the
fee simple interest, rather than a leasehold, be taken. I make this rec-
ommendation by way of a suggestion for additional study rather than
arguing that it be adopted. It is a suggestion that cuts both ways. On the
one hand, it seems only fair because the condemnee would be requesting
the court to exercise its equitable powers to ameliorate an untenable
268. See discussion supra Part V.B.5.
269. Just compensation for a partial taking includes diminution of value to the con-
demnee's remaining land. See supra note 228 and accompanying text. The reversion
clearly ought to be considered part of the remaining land. Where there is an issue of
whether adjacent property (for instance, the rest of the shopping center in which the lease-
hold is located) is part of the parcel taken or a separate unitary tract, I would favor an
interpretation that presumes a unitary tract. However, a number of interesting issues, both
fact-specific and general arise in this context, and further research on the particulars of the
calculation is encouraged. In any event, it should be noted that just compensation is not a
remedy that truly makes a condemnee whole. See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 379 (1945).
270. For instance, General Motors involved the removal of the condemnee's goods and
the destruction of some of the condemnee's fixtures to ready the premises for govern-
ment's use. Gen. Motors, 323 U.S. at 383-84. In that instance, the issue was handled in the
calculation of just compensation. Id.
271. See id. at 382 (using the same term).
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situation and provide justiceV2 The argument on behalf of this alterna-
tive would be that it does not give the condemnee the right to insist that
there be a taking of the fee simple or no taking at all.273 Before making
such a request, the condemnee could consider the practical impact of the
taking of a leasehold, leaving it with a few chips of property, versus the
compensation that might be obtainable if a fee simple were to be taken.
If my proposed modifications to just compensation for condemnations
that create leaseholds are adopted, just compensation in temporary
physical takings will include numerous elements that would not be com-
pensable in a taking of the fee.274 Likewise, if the taking was of only a
portion of the condemnee's property, it should be noted that just com-
pensation in partial takings includes elements not considered in the
measurement of just compensation in a permanent total taking in fee
simple. 5 In general, these differences in the measurement of just com-
pensation allow for elements in the calculation that are additional to
those elements available for a total taking in fee simple. Thus, if the
situation were analyzed from the perspective of law and economics, as-
suming that both the condemnee and government would behave as ra-
tional actors, allowing this remedy would make practical economic sense
for both the government and the condemnee. It would also be consistent
with my point in Part III that government should only engage in condem-
nation proceedings to establish a leasehold in situations in which it would
be the most cost-effective solution. Thus, before making the initial deci-
sion to condemn a leasehold, the government would have compared the
just compensation for a taking of the fee simple with the taking of a
leasehold. Once the leasehold extends beyond a moderate duration, it is
logical that the cost of the leasehold would be greater than the cost of the
fee simple, and government would decide to take the fee simple. As a
result, this remedy for the condemnee would come into play only if the
condemnee was willing to accept the lower just compensation and finality
of a taking in fee simple in order to avoid the ongoing relationship with
government for the duration of the taking. This logic has flaws, however.
272. The condemnee would also be asking the court to interpret its situation as a dis-
proportional burden under Armstrong. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49
(1960).
273. Thus, this alternative would seem to be in keeping with the principle that the
amount of property to be taken is generally to be decided by the government.
274. See discussion supra Part V.B.5 (describing the proposed adjustments to just com-
pensation). Even if my recommendations are not adopted, the General Motors line of
cases, particularly General Motors and Kimball Laundry, set forth elements in the meas-
urement of just compensation that are not included in just compensation for the taking of a
fee simple. See Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 16 (1949); Gen. Motors,
323 U.S. at 382-84.
275. See generally 4 SACKMAN, supra note 3, § 12.01; 4A SACKMAN, supra note 7, §
14.01.
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If the condemnee was acting solely on the motivation of maximizing eco-
nomic gain, it would choose to request this remedy only when the gov-
ernment had been correct in its original decision to establish a leasehold
through the taking. The condemnee would be trying to force a taking of
greater magnitude, a fee simple, than that requested by the government;
this would violate the principle that the government selects how much
land and what interest in land is to be taken by eminent domain. A con-
demnee could request this remedy as a strategic maneuver to try to in-
crease the compensation the condemnee would receive, or in the alterna-
tive, to make the condemnation so expensive that the government would
choose not to take the land. 27' Thus, if this suggestion is adopted, courts
should order the taking of a fee simple, rather than a leasehold, only in
the most extraordinary circumstances. Perhaps the remedy should be
limited to those in which the condemnee would receive lesser compensa-
tion from the taking in fee simple, thus restricting it to situations in which
the condemnee values finality over money.2
VI. CONCLUSION
It is my recommendation that government should engage in condemna-
tion proceedings to create a leasehold, rather than a taking in fee simple,
in circumstances in which taking a leasehold is the best solution to gov-
ernment need. This would arise when government has an important
short-term need to occupy space for a duration that can be estimated with
reasonable certainty,27' and government has been unable to obtain occu-
pancy through negotiations. However, unlike most other takings, the
creation of a leasehold through condemnation proceedings creates an
involuntary ongoing relationship between the condemnee and the holder
of the leasehold. Unlike all other takings, this relationship can become
quite complex, involving the continuous provision of services by the con-
demnee. These special characteristics call for limitations on the circum-
stances in which the creation of a leasehold should be allowed. Takings
276. Statutes that provide for slow take condemnations, as differentiated from quick
take proceedings, allow government to abandon the proceedings without taking the prop-
erty if the judgment awarded by the court is too high. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
73.101, .111 (West 2004) (quick take proceedings), with id. §§ 74.021, .031, .061 (regular
proceedings).
277. This would properly serve the interests of government because this result would
occur only in circumstances in which government should have proceeded to take the prop-
erty in fee simple in the first place. Obviously, the procedural mechanics of this final sug-
gestion would need to be worked out.
278. Note that it is possible for government to request the right for extensions and the
right of early termination. I believe that government should include such requests in the
condemnation proceedings, even though they may increase the just compensation payable
to the condemnee, unless the government can determine with certainty the date on which
its need will end. See supra note 147.
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that create a leasehold through condemnation proceedings should be
limited to those takings in which government itself, the public in general,
or an entity providing public services as an agent of government, will use
the leasehold premises. Such takings would be fiscally conscientious
means for cash-strapped governments to meet public needs and would be
in keeping with the concepts that government should not take more
property than it needs, and should not take a greater interest in property
than it needs.
In order to properly compensate the condemnee for a taking that cre-
ates a leasehold, modifications to the measurement of just compensation
are needed. These modifications would compensate, among other things,
for loss or diminution of goodwill, if proven, for the duration of the tem-
porary taking, and damage to the value of the condemnee's interest in the
property not taken. In calculating the market value of the premises
taken, the cost to acquire temporary replacement facilities for a duration
specifically coordinated with the terms of the taking would be taken into
consideration.
Although situations might not be frequent in which the taking of a
leasehold would be the best solution to government need, governmental
entities should not ignore the possibility in their deliberations. Rather, in
the interest of sound fiscal management and respect for the principles of
eminent domain, government ought to consider the establishment of a
leasehold through condemnation proceedings as one of its options, and
should engage in such takings in appropriate circumstances.
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